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I. [5.1] SCOPE OF CHAPTER
This chapter examines the effect of federal discrimination laws on permanent layoffs caused
by plant closings and reductions in force (RIFs) and discusses the federal Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act (WARN Act), Pub.L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (1988), and the
Illinois Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (Illinois WARN Act), 820 ILCS 65/1,
et seq. This chapter examines cases in which RIFs have been challenged as violating an employee’s
rights under federal age discrimination law, the legal standards applied by the courts in reviewing
such challenges, and some particular problems that have arisen in the context of company costcutting decisions. Finally, this chapter outlines practical suggestions and considerations for RIFs,
including the use of performance appraisals, waivers and releases, and early retirement incentives.
This chapter does not consider issues that might arise in a unionized setting in which the strictures
of a collective-bargaining agreement and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), ch. 372, 49
Stat. 449 (1935), might limit or impede the employer’s decision-making discretion.

II. PLANT CLOSINGS AND REDUCTIONS IN FORCE
A. [5.2] In General
Many organizations, at one time or another, are faced with the need to lay off employees for
lack of work. Some layoffs are temporary and are expected by employees because of the nature of
their jobs. These can be planned for and may not be serious. When a change in operations or a
decline in business necessitates permanent layoffs, however, the problem is more difficult.
B. [5.3] Plant Closings
Plant closings are principally the consequence of larger adjustments in the economy and in the
life of particular businesses. In a free market economy, there is a constant shift of capital with
companies merging, consolidating, and automating. In a dynamic free market economic setting,
plant closings are as basic a part of the process as plant openings.
In 1988, Congress passed federal plant-closing legislation, the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act (discussed in §§5.4 – 5.12 below). In addition, numerous states,
including Illinois, have adopted plant-closing legislation. The Illinois Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notification Act (see §5.13 below) took effect January 1, 2005. Other states that have
enacted such legislation include:
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Legislation

State

California
Connecticut

Cal.Lab. Code §§1400 – 1408
Conn.Gen.Stat. §§31-51n, 3151o

Minnesota
Nevada

Georgia

Ga.Comp.R. & Regs. 300-2-4.01(1)
Haw.Rev.Stat. §§394B-1
through 394B-13
Iowa Code Ann. §§84C.1 –
84C.5
Kan.Stat.Ann. §44-616

New
Hampshire
New Jersey

Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 26, §625B
Md.Ann. Code, Lab. & Empl.
§§11-201, 11-301 through 11306
Mass.Gen. Laws ch. 149,
§§179B, 182; ch. 151A, §§71A
– 71H
Mich.Comp. Laws §§450.731
– 450.736

Oregon

Hawaii
Iowa
Kansas
Maine
Maryland

Massachusetts

Michigan

New York
Ohio

Tennessee

Legislation
Minn.Stat. §§116L.17, 116L.976
Nev.Admin. Code §§284.076,
284.626, 284.630 (public
employees only); §§613.800 –
613.854 (expires August 31,
2022, or the date on which the
Governor terminates the March
2020 Declaration of Emergency
for COVID-19)
N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§275-F:1
through 275-F:12; §282-A:45-a
N.J.Stat.Ann. §§34:21-1 through
34:21-7
N.Y.Lab. Law §§835 – 849
(McKinney)
Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§4141.28(c)
Or.Rev.Stat. §§285A.510 –
285A.522
Tenn. Code Ann. §§50-1-601
through 50-1-604

Vermont

Vt.Stat.Ann. tit. 21, §§411-418

Wisconsin

Wis.Stat. §109.07

Some of these laws do not impose obligations distinguishable from the federal WARN Act.
However, because some have different requirements, employers must ensure that they comply with
any applicable state laws. Employers should also be aware of any applicable notice requirements
imposed by cities or other municipalities. See, e.g., Philadelphia Code, §§9-1501 through 9-1504
(imposing notice requirement for group layoffs in the City of Philadelphia); D.C. Code §§32-101
through 32-103 (providing a right to reinstatement for workers in covered industries displaced
because of COVID-19).
Because all employees are typically laid off during a plant closing, a full plant closing seldom
gives rise to claims of discrimination. If, however, the employer decides to retain or relocate some,
but not all, of the laid-off employees, the manner in which the employees to be retained or relocated
are selected could create the basis for a claim of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII), Pub.L. No. 88-352, Title VII, 78 Stat. 253; the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), Pub.L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602; the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub.L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327; Chapter 21 of Title 42 of the
United States Code, 42 U.S.C. §1981, et seq.; or other federal, state, and local antidiscrimination
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statutes. In selecting employees to be retained or relocated, the employer must take steps to ensure
that the decision-making process is (1) neutral with respect to the employees’ race, sex, disability,
age, and other protected characteristics and (2) based on performance-related considerations or
other neutral criteria. See §5.25 below for a discussion of performance appraisals. Discrimination
concerns may also arise in connection with a decision to reopen the plant at some later date.
C. [5.4] Federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
Congress enacted the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act on August 4, 1988.
The U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) subsequently promulgated relatively detailed regulations
(see 20 C.F.R. §§639.1 – 639.10), which courts have relied on to guide their decisions. Rowan v.
Chicago Housing Authority, 149 F.Supp.2d 390, 392 (N.D.Ill. 2001). Despite predictions that the
statute and regulations would result in a flood of litigation, they have not. Compliance has been
readily achievable and forthcoming by most covered employers.
The WARN Act requires employers to provide affected employees or their bargaining
representatives and certain government officials with 60 days’ advance notice of plant closings or
mass layoffs that will result in particular threshold levels of lost employment. 29 U.S.C. §2102.
1. [5.5] Employers Subject to the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
The notice requirements under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act are
applicable to any business enterprise employing (a) 100 or more employees, excluding part-time
employees, or (b) 100 or more full-time or part-time employees who, in the aggregate, work at least
4,000 hours per week, excluding overtime hours. 29 U.S.C. §2101(a)(1).
Although the WARN Act’s definition of “employer” does not expressly include governmental
entities, the Department of Labor’s position is that such entities are covered by the WARN Act
when they take part in a commercial or industrial enterprise. 20 C.F.R. §639.3. For example, the
Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) is covered by the WARN Act. Castro v. Chicago Housing
Authority, 360 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2004). In Castro, the Seventh Circuit held that quasi-public
entities are employers and subject to the WARN notice requirements if they (a) engage in business
and (b) are separately organized from the regular government. 360 F.3d at 729. The Seventh Circuit
found that the CHA was an employer as defined by the WARN Act because it engaged in business
separately from the City of Chicago. Accordingly, the two and one-half weeks’ notice that the CHA
gave to security personnel was insufficient, and the CHA was required to give 60 days’ notice of
termination under the Act. 360 F.3d at 724.
Under the WARN regulations, independent contractors and subsidiaries that are wholly owned
by a parent company may be treated as “separate employers or as a part of the parent or contracting
company depending upon the degree of their independence from the parent.” 20 C.F.R.
§639.3(a)(2). The regulations direct that the following factors be considered in making this
determination:
a. common ownership;
b. common directors and/or officers;
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c. de facto exercise of control;
d. unity of personnel policies emanating from a common source; and
e. the dependency of operations. Id.
These factors closely resemble, but are not identical to, the “single employer” or “integrated
enterprise” test that is frequently used in labor and employment law. Pearson v. Component
Technology Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 477 (3d Cir. 2001).
The USDOL has also stated that jurisprudence under the WARN Act should not deviate from
existing law used to determine liability for affiliated corporations. 54 Fed.Reg. 16,042 (Apr. 20,
1989). Not surprisingly, the tension between existing law and the USDOL factors has led to
confusion among courts as to the proper standard, and courts have applied several different tests to
determine liability. See Pearson, supra.
For example, some courts apply three different tests to determine whether parent and
grandparent corporations could be held liable for the debts of a subsidiary: state corporate law; the
integrated-enterprise/single-employer test; and the USDOL factors. Local 397, International Union
of Electronic, Electrical Salaried Machine & Furniture Workers, AFL-CIO v. Midwest Fasteners,
Inc., 779 F.Supp. 788, 792 (D.N.J. 1992). In Local 397, the court concluded that the corporations
were separate under the state law alter-ego analysis but identical under the integratedenterprise/single-employer analysis and the USDOL factors. 779 F.Supp. at 796, 798 – 799. The
court ultimately concluded that because the WARN Act was enacted to protect workers,
wrongdoers should not escape liability merely because corporate formalities were observed. 779
F.Supp. at 800. The court thus held that the outcomes of the integrated enterprise test and the
USDOL factors were controlling. Id. See also United Paperworkers International Union, AFLCIO, CLC v. Alden Corrugated Container Corp., 901 F.Supp. 426 (D.Mass. 1995) (applying state
corporate law, the integrated-enterprise/single-employer test, and the USDOL factors).
In contrast, other courts have rejected the application of the integrated-enterprise/singleemployer test and the USDOL factors. Wholesale & Retail Food Distribution Local 63 v. Santa Fe
Terminal Services, Inc., 826 F.Supp. 326 (C.D.Cal. 1993). In Santa Fe Terminal Services, the court
applied state corporate law and the USDOL factors. Relying on California corporate law, the court
held that the railroad and its subsidiary did not constitute a single employer for WARN purposes
despite the analysis under the USDOL factors, which found common ownership, management, and
benefit programs when operations, interests, and labor-related functions were separate. 826 F.Supp.
at 334 – 335.
Some courts have rejected “[t]he current trend toward applying more than one test for affiliated
corporate liability [as] manifestly unworkable” and determined that the USDOL test is most
appropriate for determining liability. Pearson, supra, 247 F.3d at 489. In Pearson, the Third Circuit
applied the USDOL test, reasoning that the multiple-test approach generated considerable
uncertainty for parties affected by the WARN Act and that state law veil-piercing standards
themselves might generate inconsistency. Id. The court also indicated that in determining whether
two or more corporations constitute a single employer, courts should consider the factors listed in
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the regulation, in addition to other indicia of corporate “sameness,” “such as nonfunctioning of
officers and directors, gross undercapitalization, and other circumstances that demonstrate a lack
of an arm’s-length relationship between the companies.” 247 F.3d at 491. See also Pennington v.
Fluor Corp., 19 F.4th 589 (4th Cir. 2021) (following Pearson and applying USDOL factors to
determine whether companies constituted single employer); In re APA Transport Corp., 541 F.3d
233, 243 (3d Cir. 2008) (same); Cleary v. American Capital Ltd., 59 F.Supp.3d 249 (D.Mass. 2014)
(same).
Similarly, lenders can be subject to the WARN Act under certain circumstances. The Second,
Sixth, Eight, and Ninth Circuits have held that a secured creditor that asserts control over a
delinquent debtor’s business may become an employer for WARN purposes. See Coppola v. Bear
Stearns & Co., 499 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2007); Smith v. Ajax Magnathermic Corp., 144 Fed.Appx.
482, 485 (6th Cir. 2005); Pearson, supra; Adams v. Erwin Weller Co., 87 F.3d 269 (8th Cir. 1996);
Chauffeurs, Sales Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Union Local 572, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, AFL-CIO v. Weslock Corp., 66 F.3d 241 (9th Cir. 1995). These circuits have focused
on an assessment of whether the lender’s actions were typical of a secured lender. The WARN Act
will apply only if the secured creditor operates the debtor’s asset as an ongoing commercial
business enterprise. Adams, supra, 87 F.3d at 272 (“Only when a lender becomes so entangled with
its borrower that it has assumed responsibility for the overall management of the borrower’s
business will the degree of control necessary to support employer responsibility under WARN be
achieved.”); Weslock Corp., supra, 66 F.3d at 244. If the creditor merely exercises financial control,
or the degree of control necessary to preserve the business asset for liquidation, the creditor is not
an employer subject to the WARN Act. 66 F.3d at 245. The Third Circuit, however, has applied a
slightly different test. In Pearson, supra, the court declined to focus on whether behavior is typical
of a secured lender, noting that typical lender behavior is a mutable concept. The court concluded
that while courts should “attend to the customary relationship between lender and borrower . . .
they should also make a functional assessment of the amount of control involved.” 247 F.3d at 495.
See also Walsh v. Richard K. Diamond, Chapter 7 Trustee (In re Century City Doctors Hospital,
LLC), BAP No. CC-09-1235-MkJaD, 2010 WL 6452903 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010) (text available in
Westlaw) (following Weslock Corp., supra, and determining that Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee
qualified as “employer”). But see Thielman v. MF Global Holdings Ltd. (In re MF Global Holdings
Ltd.), 481 B.R. 268, 282 – 283 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (applying “liquidating fiduciary” exception
and finding that Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 trustee was not “employer” because
trustee’s sole responsibility was to liquidate business).
2. [5.6] Employees Covered by the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act
The regulations under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act provide that
workers on either temporary layoff or leave who have a “reasonable expectation of recall” should
be considered employees for the purpose of calculating the requisite number of employees. 20
C.F.R. §639.3(a)(1). An employee has a reasonable expectation of recall when the employee
understands, “through notification or through industry practice,” that their employment has been
temporarily interrupted and the employee “will be recalled to the same or to a similar job.” Id. In
Damron v. Rob Fork Mining Corp., 945 F.2d 121, 124 (6th Cir. 1991), the Sixth Circuit largely
adopted the National Labor Relations Board’s test for determining whether a laid-off employee has
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a reasonable expectation of recall: (a) the past experience of the employer; (b) the employer’s future
plans; (c) the circumstances of the layoff; (d) the expected length of the layoff; and (e) the industry
practice. See also Bradley v. Sequoyah Fuels Corp., 847 F.Supp. 863, 868 (E.D.Okla. 1994) (same);
Bledsoe v. Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc., 635 F.3d 836, 848 (6th Cir. 2011) (reaffirming
Damron’s definition of “affected employee” and criteria for determining reasonableness of
expectation of recall).
In Teamsters Local 838 v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 156 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998), the Eighth
Circuit considered whether temporarily laid-off school bus drivers who were ultimately terminated
when the employer closed a facility were employees with a reasonable expectation of recall. The
court held that the employment loss triggering a WARN duty to provide notice did not arise until
the ultimate plant closing because only then did these employees lose an expectation of recall. 156
F.3d at 856. See also Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union, Local 7-629, AFLCIO v. RMI Titanium Co., 199 F.3d 881, 885 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that employees who were
temporarily recalled from layoff to cover for employees participating in voluntary layoff program
did not suffer employment loss because action did not involve elimination of any positions);
Sanders v. Kohler Co., 641 F.3d 290, 294 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding that “employees who are fired
but replaced are not part of a reduction in force and do not count as part of the aggregate number
of employee layoffs that must be met to satisfy the numerosity thresholds”).
Seasonal employees are also covered by the WARN Act. Marques v. Telles Ranch, Inc., 131
F.3d 1331, 1332 (9th Cir. 1997); Kalwaytis v. Preferred Meal Systems, Inc., 78 F.3d 117, 118 (3d
Cir. 1996). In Marques, supra, the Ninth Circuit ruled that seasonal workers may suffer an
employment loss subject to WARN notice requirements. Seasonal lettuce harvesters received a
letter during their layoff period announcing the closing of the employer’s lettuce harvesting
division. Id. The court found that the employment loss occurred on the dates the employees
expected to report back to work, not on the date of receipt of the letter. 131 F.3d at 1334. See also
Kalwaytis, supra (finding that WARN violation period begins at earlier of (a) date employees
expected to return to work or (b) date of permanent layoff).
“The WARN Act excludes ‘voluntary departure[s]’ from its definition of ‘employment
loss[es]’ that trigger its notification requirements.” Ellis v. DHL Express Inc. (USA), 633 F.3d 522,
526 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding that employees who accepted union-negotiated severance packages
“voluntarily departed” from employment even though some employees had already been laid off
and were given window of two business days to consider severance package), quoting 29 U.S.C.
§2101(a)(6). But see Collins v. Gee West Seattle LLC, 631 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“Employees’ departure because of a business closing, therefore, is generally not voluntary . . . but
a consequence of the shutdown and must be considered a loss of employment when determining
whether a plant closure has occurred.” [Footnote omitted.]).
3. [5.7] When Notice Is Required
Notice is required under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act when a plant
closing or the “permanent or temporary shutdown of a single site of employment, or one or more
facilities or operating units within a single site of employment,” results in an employment loss for
50 or more employees, excluding part-time employees, at a single site of employment during any
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30-day period. 29 U.S.C. §§2101(a)(2), 2102. Note that a plant closing does not have to result in
the shutdown of an entire plant or facility. Instead, a plant closing can exist when there is a
“permanent or temporary shutdown of a single site of employment, or one or more facilities or
operating units within a single site of employment.” 29 U.S.C. §2101(a)(2). See 29 U.S.C. §2102.
For example, the elimination of a production line (or other distinct unit) within a facility may
constitute a plant closing if the requisite numbers are met. See 20 C.F.R. §639.3(j).
Additionally, a “mass layoff,” defined as “a reduction in force which . . . is not the result of a
plant closing,” triggers the notice requirement when it results in an employment loss for at least
500 employees at a single site of employment during any 30-day period. 29 U.S.C. §2101(a)(3).
See 29 U.S.C. §2102. If a layoff involves fewer than 500 employees, notice is required if at least
one third of the employees suffers loss of employment, provided that at least 50 employees are
affected. 29 U.S.C. §2101(a)(3). While the statute focuses on a 30-day period for calculating
threshold levels of employment loss, an aggregation clause in the statute also provides that closings
and layoffs at a single site of employment during any 90-day period affecting two or more groups
of employees that individually do not meet the threshold levels of employment loss will trigger
WARN notice requirements if the groups meet the threshold levels of employment loss when
combined. 29 U.S.C. §2102(d). Of course, in some cases, this aggregation still may not produce
the requisite level of employment losses for WARN coverage.
WARN notice must be provided to (a) the chief elected officer of the exclusive representative
or bargaining agent of the affected employees if the employees are represented by a union or, if
there is no representative, to the affected employees; (b) the state dislocated worker unit; and (c)
the chief elected official of local government. 29 U.S.C. §2102(a); 20 C.F.R. §639.6.
Although the WARN Act offers no definition of “single site,” according to the regulations, a
single site of employment may refer to “either a single location or a group of contiguous locations.
Groups of structures which form a campus or industrial park, or separate facilities across the street
from one another, may be considered a single site of employment.” 20 C.F.R. §639.3(i)(1).
“Separate buildings or areas which are not directly connected or in immediate proximity may be
considered a single site of employment if they are in reasonable geographic proximity, used for the
same purpose, and share the same staff and equipment.” 20 C.F.R. §639.3(i)(3).
Thus, under the regulations, geographic proximity is the primary factor considered in
determining what constitutes a single site. 20 C.F.R. §§639.3(i)(1) – 639.3(i)(6). See also Meadows
v. Latshaw Drilling Co., 866 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2017); Dwyer v. Galen Hospital Illinois, Inc., No.
94 C 544, 1996 WL 111886 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 12, 1996). “Contiguous facilities or those in close
geographic proximity are generally single sites of employment and geographically separate
facilities are generally separate sites.” Teamsters Local Union 413 v. Driver’s, Inc., 101 F.3d 1107,
1109 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that eleven separate trucking terminals, spread over six states, were
not single sites under WARN Act). See also Williams v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 23 F.3d 930 (5th
Cir. 1994) (holding that two plants located hundreds of miles apart were separate for WARN
purposes). Of course, there are times when consolidating sites of employment still will not reach
the statutory size threshold, a fatal legal defect in a WARN claim. See, e.g., Rowan v. Chicago
Housing Authority, 149 F.Supp.2d 390, 393 (N.D.Ill. 2001).
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Although geographic proximity is considered the primary factor, it is not necessarily
dispositive. As noted in the regulations, noncontiguous facilities may be deemed a single site if
there is some connection between the facilities beyond common ownership, such as a regular
sharing of staff, equipment, and operational purpose. See Davis v. Signal International Texas GP,
LLC, 728 F.3d 482 (5th Cir. 2013); Teamsters Local Union 413, supra, 101 F.3d at 1110. Cf. Rifkin
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 78 F.3d 1277, 1280 – 1281 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that
noncontiguous sites were separate for WARN purposes because they only occasionally shared
employees, equipment, and personnel files). In addition, facilities in the same geographic area may
be considered separate single sites if they have separate management and workforces or produce
different products. 20 C.F.R. §639.3(i)(5). See also Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 61 F.3d 757, 766
(10th Cir. 1995) (holding that sites in near-contiguous buildings within same compound were
separate despite proximity and some overlap of managerial responsibilities when they had no
common employees and produced different products); International Union, United Mine Workers
v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., 6 F.3d 722, 725 – 726 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding employer’s four
mining sites were separate because three mines were contiguous, two mines were connected
underground, and centralized administrative office existed, each mine’s management team had real
organizational and operational control, and no employees rotated among mines).
The Fifth Circuit, however, has adopted a more particularized test for determining whether
separate facilities constitute a single site. Viator v. Delchamps Inc., 109 F.3d 1124 (5th Cir. 1997).
The Fifth Circuit held that separate facilities should be treated as a single site of employment only
if they meet each of the three factors enumerated in the regulations:
1) the separate facilities are in “reasonable geographic proximity” of one another; 2)
they are “used for the same purpose”; 3) and they “share the same staff and
equipment.” 109 F.3d at 1127, quoting 20 C.F.R. §639.3(i)(3).
In Viator, the court found that multiple sites that did not regularly share staff or equipment could
not be aggregated to achieve the requisite number of layoffs and subject the employer to WARN
liability. The grocery store at issue temporarily transferred 20 percent of its employees to help other
shorthanded stores. Id. The stores also shared a pressure washer and occasionally exchanged
inventory. 109 F.3d at 1127 – 1128. The Fifth Circuit held that these factors were insufficient to
establish a single site. Id. See also Sisney v. Trinidad Drilling, LP, 231 F.Supp.3d 233 (W.D.Tex.
2017) (finding that multiple sites could not be aggregated to form single site despite shared
ownership and management because there was no record of shared common purpose); Ramos Pena
v. New Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc., 84 F.Supp.2d 239 (D.P.R. 1999) (holding that
multiple sites could not be aggregated because they were not close geographically and there was
no evidence of shared staff or equipment).
The regulations also provide an exception to the general rule requiring geographic proximity
for “truly unusual organizational situations.” 20 C.F.R. §639.3(i)(8). Applying this exception, the
Fifth Circuit has held that two separate facilities constituted a single site when the employees had
previously been housed together, continued to perform the same functions, and were separated
solely due to space considerations. See Carpenters District Council of New Orleans & Vicinity v.
Dillard Department Stores, Inc., 778 F.Supp. 297 (E.D.La. 1991), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on
other grounds, 15 F.3d 1275, 1290 (5th Cir. 1994). See also Davis, supra, 728 F.3d at 486 – 487.
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But see McClain v. Laurel Street Art Club, Inc., 106 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 1997) (text available in
Westlaw) (refusing to apply exception in nearly identical circumstances and criticizing Fifth
Circuit’s rationale); Likes v. DHL Express, 25 F.Supp.3d 1352, 1360 n.20 (N.D.Ala. 2014)
(declining to apply exception to employees with different primary employers).
To determine a traveling employee’s site of employment for purposes of determining the
number of employees laid off, the court should first determine whether that employee had a “home
base.” 20 C.F.R. §639.3(i)(6). If the employee has a home base, that is the site of employment. See,
e.g., Air Line Pilots Association, International v. Pan American Airways Corp., No. Civ. 02-593M, 2004 WL 32942, *2 (D.N.H. Jan. 6, 2004) (determining that flight crew members had home
bases that were considered their respective employment sites). See also Schroeder v. Global
Aviation Holdings, Inc. (In re Global Aviation Holdings, Inc.), 483 B.R. 54, 61 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
2012) (finding that “physical connection to a location is essential to a finding that the location is a
worker’s ‘home base’ ”). Otherwise, the employee’s site of employment is “the place from which
[their] work is assigned” or the site to which the employee reported. Air Line Pilots Association,
International, supra, at *2. But cf. Teamsters Local Union 413, supra, 101 F.3d at 1110 (holding
that truck drivers working out of 11 separate terminals had no common site of employment under
20 C.F.R. §639.3(i)(6) despite fact that managerial and administrative functions were traceable to
single centralized location).
4. [5.8] Exceptions to the Notice Requirement
Certain employment losses are exempt from notice requirements under the Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification Act. In the case of the sale of part or all of an employer’s business, the
Act establishes that the seller’s employees will be considered the purchaser’s employees
immediately after the effective date of the sale. Thus, no employment loss requiring notice occurs
merely by virtue of the sale. Wiltz v. M/G Transport Services, Inc., 128 F.3d 957 (6th Cir. 1997)
(holding that sale is not WARN event); International Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Employees &
Moving Picture Machine Operators, AFL-CIO v. Compact Video Services, Inc., 50 F.3d 1464, 1468
(9th Cir. 1995) (holding that sale of union business to nonunion entity and resulting modification
of employee salaries and benefits is not WARN event). After the effective date of the sale, the
responsibility for providing 60 days’ notice shifts to the purchaser. 29 U.S.C. §2101(b)(1). See also
Guippone v. BH S & B Holdings LLC, 681 F.Supp.2d 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that purchaser
retained WARN obligations because employees of seller who were retained after sale but
terminated one month after purchase were not part-time employees by virtue of working for
purchaser for only one month); Alter v. SCM Office Supplies, Inc., 906 F.Supp. 1243 (N.D.Ind.
1995) (concluding that requiring former employees of selling company to reapply for their jobs did
not cause employment loss under WARN Act).
When a relocation or consolidation of part or all of an employer’s business is the cause of a
closing or layoff, no notice is required if, before the closing or layoff,
(A) the employer offers to transfer the employee to a different site of employment
within a reasonable commuting distance with no more than a 6–month break in
employment; or
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(B) the employer offers to transfer the employee to any other site of employment
regardless of distance with no more than a 6–month break in employment, and the
employee accepts within 30 days of the offer or of the closing or layoff, whichever is
later. Moore v. Warehouse Club, Inc., 992 F.2d 27, 29 – 30 (3d Cir. 1993).
The Moore court found that employees who were offered a transfer to a different employment site
on the date of the plant closing did not suffer an employment loss and, therefore, should not be
counted when determining whether the requisite number of employees suffered an employment
loss so as to trigger WARN notice requirements. See also Palmer v. Reese Bros., 160 Fed.Appx.
173 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding that employees who were transferred to other positions at alternative
locations did not suffer employment loss); Martin v. AMR Services Corp., 877 F.Supp. 108, 113
(E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that 18 employees displaced when employer closed department suffered
no employment loss under WARN Act because they were immediately transferred to new positions
within company). The Sixth Circuit has held that a defendant employer could not avail itself of the
relocation exception, however, when the loss of a major customer caused the employer to close its
plant and transfer remaining business to a separate facility. Saxion v. Titan-C-Manufacturing, Inc.,
86 F.3d 553, 558 (6th Cir. 1996). The court reasoned that to qualify under the relocation and transfer
exception, a plant closing must be the “result of the transfer, not the other way around.” Id. See also
Martinez v. Caravan Transportation, Inc., 253 F.Supp.2d 403 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that
transportation employees who were immediately given new jobs at same or higher wage when
employer sold routes did not suffer WARN employment loss).
The WARN Act also exempts particular closings and layoffs from its notice requirements. For
example, if a temporary facility is closed or if the layoff is the result of the completion of a particular
project and the affected employees were aware at the time of hiring that their employment was
limited to the duration of the facility or undertaking, no notice is required. 29 U.S.C. §2103(1).
Notice is similarly unnecessary if the closing or layoff constitutes a strike or lockout not intended
to evade the consequences of the WARN Act. 29 U.S.C. §2103(2).
In Washington v. Aircap Industries Corp., 831 F.Supp. 1292, 1293, 1299 (D.S.C. 1993), the
court held that a manufacturer of outdoor power equipment was not a temporary facility exempt
from WARN requirements under 29 U.S.C. §2103 even though the manufacturer had historically
laid off some workers at the start of each summer and rehired them at the end of the summer. After
noting that exceptions to the WARN Act must be construed narrowly, the court reasoned that the
facility hired workers for indefinite periods rather than for discrete projects with ascertainable
completion dates. 831 F.Supp. at 1296 – 1297. Further, although employment at the facility was
seasonal, the defendant’s contracts were renewable and employment was recurring. 831 F.Supp. at
1297. Finally, the court held that workers did not understand at the time of hire that their
employment was temporary, as required by WARN regulations for application of the temporary
facility exception. 831 F.Supp. at 1298. The defendant facility failed to show that it had “clearly
communicated the allegedly ‘temporary’ nature of the employment to the employees at the time of
hire.” Id.
Several courts have held that the WARN Act does not apply to government-ordered closings
or closings in which both the government and the employer play a role. In Buck v. Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp., 75 F.3d 1285 (8th Cir. 1996), the Eighth Circuit held that the Federal Deposit
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Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was not subject to WARN requirements when it took over a failing
bank. In Buck, the FDIC organized a “bridge” or transition bank to purchase the assets and assume
the liabilities of two failed banks until those assets could be transferred to a healthy successor bank.
The court held that the WARN Act was inapplicable to the FDIC’s closure of the bridge bank
because imposing notice requirements “could severely hinder the FDIC’s ability to resolve bank
failures . . . efficiently and expeditiously.” 75 F.3d at 1290. Similarly, in Deveraturda v. Globe
Aviation Security Services, 454 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2006), the Ninth Circuit held that
government-controlled layoffs were not subject to the WARN Act. In Deveraturda, the San Jose
International Airport hired Globe Airport Security Services, Inc., for its airport security needs. In
2001, as a result of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub.L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597
(2001), airport security was federalized and private companies were dismissed from such duties.
Some terminated employees initiated a class action against the defendant for failure to give 60
days’ notice under the WARN Act. The Ninth Circuit found that the WARN Act was not applicable
because the layoff was government-ordered and not within the employer’s control. The Ninth
Circuit compared the government takeover of airport security to the FDIC’s bank takeover in Buck,
supra. 454 F.3d at 1048.
5. [5.9] Reduction of the Notice Period
Under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, three circumstances warrant
reduction of the 60-day notice period, though none of these circumstances eliminate the obligation
to provide notice. Newman v. Crane, 435 F.Supp.3d 834 (N.D.Ill. 2020); Carroll v. World
Marketing Holdings, LLC, 418 F.Supp.3d 299 (E.D.Wis. 2019).
First, employers may be entitled to the benefit of the “faltering company” exception. If, 60 days
before the closing, the employer was actively seeking capital or business that would have avoided
or postponed the closing and the employer reasonably and in good faith believed that giving the
required notice would have prevented the employer from obtaining the necessary capital or
business, then the employer may order the closing or layoff before the end of the 60-day period. 20
C.F.R. §639.9(a). This exception applies only when a layoff is caused by the employer’s failure to
obtain sufficient capital. Carpenters District Council of New Orleans & Vicinity v. Dillard Dept.
Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1281 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that faltering company exception did not
apply because reverse triangular merger had directly caused employee layoffs, rather than search
for additional capital).
To be eligible for the exception, the employer must be “actively seeking” additional capital as
of the time that notice would have been required. In re APA Transport Corp. Consolidated
Litigation, 541 F.3d 233, 248 (3d Cir. 2008). In APA, the Third Circuit found that the faltering
company exception did not apply because the defendant employer was not actively seeking
financing from a lender. The court reasoned that the employer had not initiated a meeting with the
lender during which additional financing was discussed, did not submit a formal request for
financing to the lender, and took no steps to secure financing following the meeting. 541 F.3d at
249 – 250. See also Local 397, International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried, Machine &
Furniture Workers, AFL-CIO v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 763 F.Supp. 78 (D.N.J. 1990) (holding
that coordinating sale of facility did not constitute actively seeking capital or business within
meaning of exceptions to WARN notice requirements).
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The second situation in which a reduction of the required notice period is allowed occurs when
the closing or layoff is caused by business circumstances that were not reasonably foreseeable at
the time notice would have been required or in the event of a natural disaster. 20 C.F.R.
§§639.9(b)(1), 639.9(c). There is, however, no per se rule concerning what constitutes
unforeseeable business circumstances. Pena v. American Meat Packing Corp., 362 F.3d 418 (7th
Cir. 2004). Instead, there should be a case-by-case analysis. 362 F.3d at 421. When determining
whether a mass layoff was caused by unforeseeable business circumstances, courts should evaluate
whether a similarly situated employer exercising reasonable judgment could have foreseen the
circumstances that caused the layoff. Acevedo v. Heinemann’s Bakeries, Inc., 619 F.Supp.2d 529,
535 (N.D.Ill. 2008); 20 C.F.R. §639.9(b)(2). Moreover, for the exception to be applicable, the
employer must demonstrate that “(1) the circumstance was unforeseeable, and (2) the layoffs were
caused by that circumstance.” Gross v. Hale-Halsell Co., 554 F.3d 870, 875 (10th Cir. 2009).
According to at least one court and the Department of Labor, this exception should not be narrowly
construed. United Steel Workers of America Local 2660 v. United States Steel Corp., 683 F.3d 882,
886 (8th Cir. 2012). See also In re AE Liquidation, Inc., 866 F.3d 515, 531 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[A]
layoff becomes reasonably foreseeable only when it becomes more likely than not that it will
occur.”)
In Roquet v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 398 F.3d 585, 587 – 588 (7th Cir. 2005), the Seventh Circuit
found that the defendant satisfied the unforeseeable business circumstances exception when the
defendant company was indicted by the government after an investigation and was forced to make
mass layoffs. The Seventh Circuit held that the company reacted to the government investigation
as a reasonable employer would, by fighting to save the company while waiting to see if it was
indicted. 398 F.3d at 589. See also Pennington v. Fluor Corp., 19 F.4th 589 (4th Cir. 2021) (finding
that employer did not violate WARN Act notice requirement when closure was due to
unforeseeable business exception resulting from client’s abrupt plant shutdown); In re AE
Liquidation, Inc., supra (applying unforeseeable business circumstances exception when employer
failed to obtain financing necessary to finalize sale); Watson v. Michigan Industrial Holdings, Inc.,
311 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding unforeseeable business circumstances exception applied
when company suddenly and unexpectedly lost supply contract); Hotel Employees & Restaurant
Employees International Union Local 54 v. Elsinore Shore Associates, 173 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1999)
(applying unforeseeable business circumstances exception when government agency refused to
renew casino’s license in unprecedented decision); Jurcev v. Central Community Hospital, 7 F.3d
618 (7th Cir. 1993) (ruling that hospital’s loss of primary funding source constituted unforeseeable
business circumstance justifying reduction in notice period); United Steel Workers of America
Local 2660, supra (applying unforeseeable business circumstances exception based on
unforeseeability of 2008 economic crisis); Pearce v. Faurecia Exhaust Systems, Inc., No. 3:10-cv282, 2012 WL 2884748 (S.D. Ohio July 13, 2012) (applying unforeseeable business circumstances
exception when layoff was caused by Chrysler’s sudden bankruptcy).
Similarly, in Bradley v. Sequoyah Fuels Corp., 847 F.Supp. 863 (E.D.Okla. 1994), the court
held that the unforeseeable business circumstances exception applied when the unexpected release
of nitrogen dioxide led to the defendant’s plant closing. Cf. Calloway v. Caraco Pharmaceutical
Laboratories, Ltd., 800 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 2015) (declining to apply unforeseeable business
circumstances exception when drug manufacturer’s products were seized by Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) following several warnings from FDA of violations of FDA regulations);
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International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, General Truck
Drivers, Office, Food & Warehouse Local 952 v. American Delivery Service Co., 50 F.3d 770 (9th
Cir. 1995) (finding that fact that employer could have, but did not, negotiate provision in contract
requiring customer to provide 60-day cancellation notice did not compel finding that unforeseeable
business circumstances exception was unavailable to employer); United Paperworkers
International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC v. Alden Corrugated Container Corp., 901 F.Supp. 426, 443
(D.Mass. 1995) (holding that bank’s decision to call defendant employer’s loans and order
cessation of operations was not unforeseen when such events were “culmination of . . . continuing,
and admittedly worsening, financial devastation”); Czyzewski v. Jevic Transportation, Inc. (In re
Jevic Holding Corp.), 496 B.R. 151 (Bankr. D.Del. 2013) (declining to apply unforeseeable
business circumstances exception after bank’s decision not to extend forbearance because
business’s failure was not just possible but probable).
Finally, reduction of the notice period is permitted in the event of a natural disaster. 20 C.F.R.
§639.9(c). Natural disasters include “[f]loods, earthquakes, droughts, storms, tidal waves or
tsunamis and similar effects of nature.” 20 C.F.R. §639.9(c)(1). At least one court has held that the
COVID-19 pandemic qualifies as a natural disaster under the WARN Act. Easom v. US Well
Services, Inc., 527 F.Supp.3d 898 (S.D.Tex. 2021) (appeal pending). To qualify for the natural
disaster exception, the employer must demonstrate that the plant closing or mass layoff is “a direct
result of a natural disaster.” 20 C.F.R. §639.9(c)(2). The regulations note that “[w]here a plant
closing or mass layoff occurs as an indirect result of a natural disaster, the exception does not apply
but the ‘unforeseeable business circumstance’ exception . . . may be applicable.” [Emphasis added.]
20 C.F.R. §639.9(c)(4).
Employers should note that, to rely on any of the exceptions, employers must “give as much
notice as is practicable.” 29 U.S.C. §2102(b)(3); Newman v. Crane, Heyman, Simon, Welch, &
Clar, 435 F.Supp.3d 834 (N.D.Ill. 2020); Carroll v. World Marketing Holdings, LLC, 418
F.Supp.3d 299 (E.D.Wis. 2019). But see Richards v. Advanced Accessory Systems, LLC (In re
Advanced Accessory Systems, LLC), 443 B.R. 756, 767 (Bankr. E.D.Mich. 2011) (“The statute does
not require that an employer provide sixty days written notice as a pre-condition to asserting one
of the defenses set forth in the Act.”).
When notice is provided, employers “shall give a brief statement of the basis for reducing the
notification period.” 29 U.S.C. §2102(b)(3). This brief statement should identify the underlying
factual events that necessitated a shortened notice period and set forth reasonably specific facts
rather than conclusory assertions. See Alarcon v. Keller Industries, Inc., 27 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir.
1994) (noting that “a company’s statement of its basis for a shortened notice period should set forth
the underlying factual events which led to the shortened period”); Grimmer v. Lord Day & Lord,
937 F.Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding notice of closing inadequate when notice contained
conclusory assertion that closing arose from unforeseeable business circumstances); Acevedo,
supra, 619 F.Supp.2d at 536 – 537 (finding that notice “may well fail to meet the WARN Act’s
notice requirements” because it did not explain basis for reduction of notice period); Ien v.
TransCare Corp. (In re TransCare Corp.), 611 B.R. 160 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding that
contradictory and confusing notices that failed to state date of layoff, which employees would be
terminated, and who could answer questions was insufficient to satisfy even shortened notice
requirements).
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6. [5.10] Employees to Whom Notice Must Be Given
An employer is obligated to provide notice of a plant closing or mass layoff to all affected
employees. 29 U.S.C. §2102(a). Under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act,
both part-time employees and full-time employees may be affected employees entitled to notice.
20 C.F.R. §639.6. In addition, several courts have held that employees on temporary layoff should
also be considered affected employees entitled to the same notice under the WARN Act as
employees working on the date of termination. See Kildea v. Electro Wire Products, Inc., 792
F.Supp. 1046 (E.D.Mich. 1992) (finding that employees on layoff with reasonable expectation of
recall are entitled to notice), aff’d, 144 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 1998). See also Damron v. Rob Fork
Mining Corp., 945 F.2d 121, 123 – 124 (6th Cir. 1991) (considering whether laid-off employees
have reasonable expectation of recall under WARN Act and applying National Labor Relations
Board’s test for determining whether person on layoff is employee under National Labor Relations
Act); Nelson v. Formed Fiber Technologies, Inc., 856 F.Supp.2d 235, 241 (D.Me. 2012) (finding
that former employee did not suffer “employment loss” when he accepted another position prior to
being recalled from layoff despite his subjective expectation that layoff would exceed six months);
Bradley v. Sequoyah Fuels Corp., 847 F.Supp. 863, 868 – 869 (E.D.Okla. 1994) (holding that
contract employee who obtained job at closed plant through temporary agency was not affected
employee entitled to seek relief under WARN Act); Goodman v. Mr. Goodbuys of New York Corp.
(In re Mr. Goodbuys of New York Corp.), 164 B.R. 24, 29 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that
employee terminated more than 90 days before mass layoffs at employer’s plant was not affected
employee under WARN Act).
7. [5.11] Contents of a Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act Notice
Under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, the notice given to each
affected employee must contain, in language understandable to the employee, (a) a statement as to
whether the planned action is expected to be permanent or temporary and, if the entire plant is to
be closed, a statement to that effect; (b) the expected date when the plant closing or mass layoff
will commence and the expected date when the individual employee will be separated; (c) a
statement as to whether bumping rights exist; and (d) the name and telephone number of a company
official to contact for further information. 20 C.F.R. §639.7. The notice may also include any
additional useful information, such as information regarding dislocated worker assistance and, if
the planned action is expected to be temporary, the estimated duration. Id. Minor errors are not
necessarily a basis for finding a violation of the WARN Act. 20 C.F.R. §639.7(a)(4) (“It is not the
intent of the regulations, that . . . minor, inadvertent errors are to be the basis for finding a violation
of WARN.”). See also Butler v. Fluor Corp., 511 F.Supp.3d 688 (D.S.C. 2021) (finding that notice
containing e-mail address instead of phone number did not invalidate compliance with WARN
Act).
The notice given to each representative of the affected employees must contain (a) the name
and address of the employment site where the plant closing or mass layoff will occur; (b) the name
and telephone number of a company official to contact for further information; (c) a statement as
to whether the planned action is expected to be permanent or temporary and, if the entire plant is
to be closed, a statement to that effect; (d) the expected date of the first separation and the
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anticipated separation schedule; and (e) the job titles of positions to be affected and the names of
the workers currently holding affected jobs. Again, the notice may also include any additional
useful information, such as information regarding dislocated worker assistance and, if the planned
action is expected to be temporary, the estimated duration. 20 C.F.R. §639.7.
Finally, the notices provided to the state dislocated worker unit and to the chief elected official
of the unit of local government must contain (a) the name and address of the employment site where
the plant closing or mass layoff will occur; (b) the name and telephone number of a company
official to contact for further information; (c) a statement as to whether the planned action is
expected to be permanent or temporary and, if the entire plant is to be closed, a statement to that
effect; (d) the expected date of the first separation and the anticipated separation schedule; (e) the
job titles of positions to be affected and the number of affected employees in each job classification;
(f) a statement as to whether bumping rights exist; and (g) the name of each union representing
affected employees and the name and address of the chief elected officer of each union.
Alternatively, the notice to the state dislocated worker unit and the chief elected official may be
satisfied by providing a written notice of the name and address of the site involved, the name and
telephone number of the company official to contact for further information, the expected date of
the first separation, and the number of affected employees. The other information required in the
notice must be readily available to the state dislocated worker unit or chief elected official. Failure
to have the information readily available will be deemed a failure to provide the required notice.
Id.
8. [5.12] Cause of Action and Liability Under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act
A cause of action under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act accrues when
there has been an employment loss. 29 U.S.C. §2104(a). In instances of employment termination,
such as a plant closing, the termination immediately qualifies as an employment loss. Accordingly,
a WARN claim accrues on the date of employment termination. See Automobile Mechanics’ Local
No. 701 of International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v. Santa Fe
Terminal Services, Inc., 830 F.Supp. 432 (N.D.Ill. 1993); Finkler v. Elsinore Shore Associates, 725
F.Supp. 828 (D.N.J. 1989).
Some disagreement exists among the courts with respect to when a cause of action accrues
based on a mass layoff. In Automobile Mechanics’ Local No. 701, supra, the court ruled that a
WARN cause of action based on a mass layoff does not accrue until after the layoff has exceeded
six months. In so ruling, the court relied on 29 U.S.C. §2101(a)(6), which defines “employment
loss” as a layoff exceeding six months. The court concluded that because an employment loss is a
necessary element of a damages claim under the WARN Act, a claim based on a layoff cannot
accrue until the employees have been laid off for more than six months. 830 F.Supp. at 434. But
see Finkler, supra, 725 F.Supp. at 831 (finding that as long as mass layoff is reasonably expected
to last more than six months and employees may reasonably be expected to experience employment
loss as consequence, employees may immediately institute action under WARN Act).
The WARN Act does not contain an express statute of limitations. The U.S. Supreme Court,
however, has held that state law provides the proper source of the limitations period for civil actions
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brought to enforce the WARN Act. North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 132 L.Ed.2d 27,
115 S.Ct. 1927 (1995). See, e.g., Staudt v. Glastron, 92 F.3d 312 (5th Cir. 1996); Ceglarek v. John
Crane, Inc., No. 96 C 6672, 2000 WL 1745183 (N.D.Ill. Nov. 27, 2000). The Supreme Court did
not, however, specify which state statute of limitations is applicable. The Second, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits have held that the state breach-of-contract limitations period is applicable to WARN
claims. United Paperworkers International Union v. Specialty Paperboard, Inc., 999 F.2d 51, 57
(2d Cir. 1993); Aaron v. Brown Group, Inc., 80 F.3d 1220, 1224 – 1225 (8th Cir. 1996); Frymire
v. Ampex Corp., 61 F.3d 757, 764 (10th Cir. 1995). See also Nelson v. Formed Fiber Technologies,
Inc., 856 F.Supp.2d 235 (D.Me. 2012) (applying breach-of-contract limitations period). But see
Bledsoe v. Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc., 635 F.3d 836, 842 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[A] better
comparison might be to a breach of an employer’s fiduciary duty, which is an action recognized as
equitable in nature.”).
Any employer who orders a closing or layoff in violation of WARN notice requirements is
liable to affected employees for backpay for each day of violation during the violation period. 29
U.S.C. §2104(a). Courts have held that such backpay payments are civil damages and not wages
for the purposes of state wage payment statutes. Taylor v. Mutual Mining, Inc., 209 W.Va. 32, 543
S.E.2d 313, 315 (2000) (applying West Virginia Wage Payment and Protection Act, W.Va. Code
§21-5-1, et seq.). Also, employers are liable for “benefits under an employee benefit plan described
in [§3(3) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub.L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (29 U.S.C. §1002(3)], including the cost of medical expenses incurred during the
employment loss which would have been covered under an employee benefit plan if the
employment loss had not occurred.” 29 U.S.C. §2104(a)(1)(B).
The majority of circuits, including the Seventh Circuit, have found that employers who violate
the WARN Act must pay damages based on the number of workdays within the violation period,
as distinguished from calendar days. Castro v. Chicago Housing Authority, No. 99 C 6910, 2003
WL 21518321, *11 (N.D.Ill. July 1, 2003), aff’d, 360 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2004); Local 1239,
International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers & Helpers v.
Allsteel, Inc., 9 F.Supp.2d 901, 903 (N.D.Ill. 1998). See also Local Joint Executive Board of
Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding
that backpay should be calculated based on workdays and include tips and holidays or vacation pay
for days that would have been worked); Joe v. First Bank System, Inc., 202 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir.
2000) (holding that backpay should be calculated based on workdays); Burns v. Stone Forest
Industries, Inc., 147 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998) (same); Breedlove v. Earthgrains Baking Cos., 140
F.3d 797 (8th Cir. 1998) (same).
In contrast, the Third Circuit has taken the minority position that an employer must pay backpay
damages for each calendar day within the violation period, regardless of whether that day would
have been a regular workday for each aggrieved employee. See United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO-CLC v. North Star Steel Co., 5 F.3d 39 (3d Cir. 1993). See also 1199 SEIU United
Healthcare Workers East v. South Bronx Mental Health Council, Inc., No. 13 Civ.
2768(JGK)(JCF), 2013 WL 6003731 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2013); In re 710 Long Ridge Road
Operating Co., 505 B.R. 163 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2014).
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In addition, at least one court has held that aggrieved employees may also recover prejudgment
interest on damages recovered for WARN violations. Carpenters District Council of New Orleans
& Vicinity v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 15 F.3d 1275, 1288 – 1289 (5th Cir. 1994). Punitive
damages, however, may not be available in WARN cases. Finnan v. L.F. Rothschild & Co., 726
F.Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that 29 U.S.C. §2104(b) provided exclusive remedies and
unambiguously foreclosed the availability of punitive damages under the WARN Act).
Under the WARN Act, a prevailing party may also recover attorneys’ fees. 29 U.S.C. §2104.
The WARN attorneys’ fees provision is virtually identical to the fee-shifting language in many
civil rights statutes. Local Union No. 1992 of International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v.
Okonite Co., 358 F.3d 278, 287 (3d Cir. 2004).
The Supreme Court, reversing a decision by the Eighth Circuit, has held that unions have
standing under Article III, §1, of the U.S. Constitution to bring WARN suits for damages on behalf
of their members. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc.,
517 U.S. 544, 134 L.Ed.2d 758, 116 S.Ct. 1529 (1996). In contrast, at least one court has held that
pension and health and welfare funds do not have standing to bring WARN suits. In re APA
Transport Corp. Consolidated Litigation, 541 F.3d 233, 242 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that “only
employees, union representatives and units of local government may bring suit”).
Finally, if the employer fails to provide notice to the state dislocated worker unit and the
appropriate unit of local government as required by the WARN Act, the employer incurs a civil
penalty of $500 for each day of such violation. 29 U.S.C. §2104(a)(3). Moreover, the WARN Act
provides that WARN rights and remedies do not preempt an employee’s contractual statutory
rights. 29 U.S.C. §2105.
The WARN Act permits an employer to reduce the amount of its liability under the Act by any
earnings or benefits the employee received from the employer during the violation period. 29
U.S.C. §2104(a)(2). Excluded, however, are those payments an employer was legally obligated to
make. For example, the Third Circuit has held that an employer could not deduct severance
payments required under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub.L.
No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, from its WARN liability. Ciarlante v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 143 F.3d 139, 152 (3d Cir. 1998). Similarly, the Seventh Circuit refused to allow severance
payments to reduce WARN damages. Castro v. Chicago Housing Authority, 360 F.3d 721, 734
(7th Cir. 2004). The severance payments were provided for in the same document as the settlement
agreement under which the unions abdicated their rights to legal recourse. Id. The Seventh Circuit
compared the involuntary and conditional severance payments to the ERISA payments at issue in
Ciarlante. Castro, supra, 360 F.3d at 734 – 735, citing Ciarlante, supra, 143 F.3d at 152. The court
found that because the severance payments were not voluntary or unconditional, they could not be
used to reduce damages. 360 F.3d at 733. See also Gray v. Walt Disney Co., 915 F.Supp.2d 725,
734 (D.Md. 2013) (“Preexisting ERISA severance benefits are not ‘wages’ and were legally owed
to the plaintiffs in full for an involuntary layoff.”).
Also, a court has discretion to reduce an employer’s damages under the WARN Act if the
employer demonstrates that it made a good-faith effort to comply with the Act. 29 U.S.C.
§2104(a)(4). The good-faith exception requires an employer to prove both a subjective intent to
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comply and an objectively reasonable interpretation of the Act’s requirements. See Frymire, supra,
61 F.3d at 767 – 768 (holding that district court abused its discretion in failing to reduce employer’s
WARN damages when employer reasonably but mistakenly determined that closed facility
constituted single site of employment after conferring with corporate counsel). In Castro, supra,
360 F.3d at 732, the Seventh Circuit refused to reduce damages based on a good-faith effort to
comply with the WARN Act because the employer did not do “everything possible” to give the
employees adequate notice of termination. The Seventh Circuit found that the defendant took only
minimal steps by sending an advance notice one month before the official notice to only union
members rather than to all employees. Id. Also, the advance notice merely stated that the CHA was
“contemplating” a security force closing and did not affirmatively announce the closing. Id. Finally,
the Seventh Circuit found that the defendant’s actions post-violation were not evidence of a goodfaith attempt to comply with the WARN Act. 360 F.3d at 731 – 732. See also Day v. Celadon
Trucking Services, Inc., 827 F.3d 817, 836 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding that company failed to show
reasonable basis for believing that it was not responsible for giving WARN notice).
D. [5.13] Illinois Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
The Illinois Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act became effective January 1,
2005. The Illinois WARN Act is patterned after the federal WARN Act and whenever possible
“shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act and the federal regulations and court decisions interpreting that Act to the extent
that the provisions of federal and State law are the same.” 820 ILCS 65/55. The Illinois WARN
Act, however, is broader than its federal counterpart.
The Illinois WARN Act covers some employers who are not subject to the federal WARN Act.
The federal WARN Act covers employers of 100 or more full-time employees or 100 or more
employees who in the aggregate work at least 4,000 hours per week, excluding overtime hours. 29
U.S.C. §2101(a)(1). The Illinois WARN Act covers employers of 75 or more full-time employees
or 75 or more employees who in the aggregate work at least 4,000 hours per week, excluding
overtime hours. 820 ILCS 65/5(c). The Illinois WARN Act does not expressly require that the 75
or more full-time employees must work in Illinois.
While the Illinois WARN Act mirrors the federal WARN Act with regard to the definition of
a “plant closing,” the Illinois WARN Act’s definition of a “mass layoff” requires notice for smaller
mass layoffs. Under the federal WARN Act, “mass layoff” means a reduction in force that (1) is
not the result of a plant closing and (2) results in an employment loss at the single site of
employment during any 30-day period for (a) at least 33 percent of the full-time employees and at
least 50 full-time employees or (b) at least 500 full-time employees. 29 U.S.C. §2101(a)(3). Under
the Illinois WARN Act, “mass layoff” means a RIF that (1) is not the result of a plant closing and
(2) results in an employment loss at the single site of employment during any 30-day period for (a)
at least 33 percent of the full-time employees and at least 25 full-time employees or (b) at least 250
full-time employees. 820 ILCS 65/5(d). Under both federal and state laws, the 30-day period may
be expanded to a 90-day period in the event of layoffs of two or more groups. 29 U.S.C. §2102(d);
820 ILCS 65/25. Also, both laws require notice to part-time employees, although such employees
are not counted when determining whether a plant closing or a mass layoff occurred. 29 U.S.C.
§§2101(a)(5), 2102(a)(1); 820 ILCS 65/5(a), 65/10(a).
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The Illinois WARN Act also requires that employers provide 60 days’ advance notice to
affected employees in the event of relocation. 820 ILCS 65/10. The term “relocation,” however, is
not expressly defined in the statute. Employment loss does not occur in the event of relocation if
the employer offers to transfer the affected employees to other places of employment within
commuting distance or if the employees accept a transfer offer, regardless of the distance. 820 ILCS
65/5(b).
The Illinois WARN Act requires notice to individual employees, even if the employees are
represented by a union, while the federal WARN Act provides that notice to the union is sufficient.
The Illinois WARN Act also requires notice to more local government officials than the federal
WARN Act. Under the federal WARN Act, notice must be provided to (1) the chief elected officer
of the exclusive representative or bargaining agent of the affected employees if the employees are
represented by a union or, if there is no representative, to the affected employees; (2) the state
dislocated worker unit; and (3) the chief elected official of local government. 29 U.S.C. §2102(a);
20 C.F.R. §639.6. Under the Illinois WARN Act, an employer must give 60 days’ advance written
notice of a mass layoff, relocation, or employment loss to (1) the affected employees, (2)
representatives of affected employees, (3) the Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic
Opportunity, and (4) the chief elected official of each municipal and county government within
which the employment loss, relocation, or mass layoff occurs. 820 ILCS 65/10(a). In both the state
and federal WARN Acts, “representative” is defined as the exclusive representative of employees
within the meaning of §9(a) or §8(f) of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. §159(a) or
§158(f)) or §2 of the Railway Labor Act (RLA), ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (45 U.S.C. §152). See
29 U.S.C. §2101(a)(4); 820 ILCS 65/5(g). The Illinois WARN Act provides that “[a]n employer
required to give notice . . . under this Act shall include in its notice the elements required by the
federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (29 U.S.C. 2101, et seq.).” 820 ILCS
65/10(b).
The Illinois WARN Act provides for the federal WARN Act’s faltering companies and
unforeseeable business circumstances exceptions to the 60-day notice requirement. 820 ILCS
65/15(a). Unlike the federal WARN Act, the exceptions are available only if the Illinois Department
of Labor (IDOL) determines that the exceptions should apply. See 29 U.S.C. §2102(b); 820 ILCS
65/15(a). To make this determination, the Illinois WARN Act requires the employer to provide to
IDOL
(1) a written record consisting of those documents relevant to the determination of
whether the employer was actively seeking capital or business, or that the need for
notice was not reasonably foreseeable; and
(2) an affidavit verifying the contents of the documents contained in the record. 820
ILCS 65/15(b).
Also, the damages provisions of the federal and state Acts are slightly different. Under the
federal WARN Act, employers who fail to give the required notice are liable to each aggrieved
employee who suffers an employment loss for
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(A) back pay for each day of violation . . .
(B) benefits under an employee benefit plan described in [29 U.S.C. §1002(3)],
including the cost of medical expenses incurred during the employment loss which
would have been covered under an employee benefit plan if the employment loss had
not occurred. 29 U.S.C. §2104(a)(1).
Under the Illinois WARN Act, employers are liable to each aggrieved employee for
(1) Back pay at the average regular rate of compensation received by the employee
during the last three years of his or her employment, or the employee’s final rate of
compensation, whichever is higher.
(2) The value of the cost of any benefits to which the employee would have been
entitled had his or her employment not been lost, including the cost of any medical
expenses incurred by the employee that would have been covered under an employee
benefit plan. 820 ILCS 65/35(a).
Under the Illinois WARN Act, employers are likely to be liable to an aggrieved employee for such
non-ERISA benefits as paid time-off days the employee would have accrued or earned during the
period of violation. An employer’s backpay liability under the Illinois WARN Act, however, will
be reduced by “[a]ny liability paid by the employer under federal law.” 820 ILCS 65/35(c)(4).
The civil penalty under both the federal and Illinois WARN Acts is the same: up to $500 per
day for each day of the employer’s violation. 29 U.S.C. §2104(a)(3); 820 ILCS 65/40(a). “Any
penalty amount paid by the employer under federal law shall be considered a payment made under
[the Illinois WARN] Act.” 820 ILCS 65/40(c).
Under the federal WARN Act, if an employer proves to the satisfaction of the court that the act
or omission that violated the federal Act was in good faith and that the employer had reasonable
grounds for believing that the act or omission was not a violation of the federal Act, “the court may,
in its discretion, reduce the amount of the liability or penalty.” 29 U.S.C. §2104(a)(4). Similarly,
under the Illinois WARN Act,
[i]f an employer proves to the satisfaction of the Director [of IDOL] that the act or
omission . . . was in good faith and that the employer had reasonable grounds for
believing that the act or omission was not a violation of this Act, the Director may in
his or her discretion reduce the amount of the penalty. 820 ILCS 65/40(d).
Under the federal WARN Act, an employer who fails to give the required notice may be sued
in federal court, and the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party reasonable attorneys’
fees as part of the costs. 29 U.S.C. §§2104(a)(5), 2104(a)(6). The Illinois WARN Act does not
expressly provide for attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party.
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Finally, the Illinois WARN Act gives the Director of IDOL the power to make rules providing
for administrative hearings and the power to examine the records of an employer to determine
whether a violation of the Illinois Act occurred. 820 ILCS 65/30. Under the federal WARN Act,
compliance is not monitored by an administrative agency. Instead, affected employees or their
representatives may file civil lawsuits in federal court. 29 U.S.C. §2104(a)(5).
E. [5.14] Reductions in Force
Permanent layoffs resulting from reductions in force, like other employment decisions, may
not lawfully be based on categories protected by Title VII. However, “bona fide” seniority systems
(42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(h)), and permanent layoffs resulting from reductions in force based strictly
on seniority are usually immunized from liability under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 81 L.Ed.2d 483, 104 S.Ct. 2576, 2581
(1984) (upholding “last hired, first fired” layoff plan); International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 52 L.Ed.2d 396, 97 S.Ct. 1843 (1977). Perhaps because some
employers find it hard to resist the temptation to use budget cutbacks or market changes as pretexts
for retiring employees who have reached the highest pay ranges, the most successful challenges to
permanent layoffs resulting from RIFs have been brought under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. See, e.g., Zaccagnini v. Chas. Levy Circulating Co., 338 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003)
(affirming finding that 51-year-old employee laid off in RIF along with 10 others could proceed
with age discrimination claim when employee sought to be rehired and was passed over in favor of
younger similarly qualified employees, and company offered shifting reasons for passing him
over); Barcenas v. Molon Motor & Coil Corp., 700 F.Supp.2d 994 (N.D.Ill. 2010) (holding that
ADEA action brought by 9 terminated employees survived employer’s summary judgment motion
when all 12 employees terminated in RIF, including all 9 plaintiffs, were over age 40 and employer
offered shifting explanations for selecting them for termination). Illinois employers should note
that the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/1-101, et seq., the Cook County Human Rights
Ordinance, Cook County Code of Ordinances §42-30, et seq., and the Chicago Human Rights
Ordinance, Chicago Municipal Code §2-160-10, et seq., also prohibit discrimination in
employment on the basis of age (among many other protected characteristics and traits).

III. [5.15] AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act prohibits employers from discriminating in
employment practices and decisions against workers 40 years of age or older. 29 U.S.C. §631.
Excluded from the prohibitions of the ADEA are
a. certain employment decisions and practices, otherwise discriminatory, that are considered
justified because they are based on a “bona fide occupational qualification” (29 U.S.C.
§623(f)(1));
b. certain types of employee retirement and benefit systems (29 U.S.C. §623(f)(2)); and
c. certain decisions based “on reasonable factors other than age” (29 U.S.C. §623(f)(1)).
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Because the ADEA’s prohibitions are worded in language nearly identical to that of Title VII,
courts frequently look to precedent under Title VII to interpret the ADEA. See, e.g., Oscar Mayer
& Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 60 L.Ed.2d 609, 99 S.Ct. 2066 (1979); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S.
575, 55 L.Ed.2d 40, 98 S.Ct. 866 (1978) (noting similar statutory aims and substantive provisions
but different remedial and procedural provisions).
To be subject to the ADEA, an employer must be engaged in an industry affecting commerce
and must have had 20 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar
weeks during the current or preceding calendar year. 29 U.S.C. §630(b). However, states and their
political subdivisions are “employers” covered by the ADEA regardless of whether they have 20
employees. Mount Lemmon Fire District v. Guido, __ U.S. __, 202 L.Ed.2d 262, 139 S.Ct. 22
(2018). The term “industry affecting commerce” refers to any activity, business, or industry in
commerce or in which a labor dispute would impede the free flow of commerce. 29 U.S.C. §630(h).
The ADEA, on its face, also covers federal, state, and local governments. 29 U.S.C. §§631(b),
633a. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that the ADEA does not validly abrogate
the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit by private individuals and that the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids only instances of age discrimination in which the age-based classification is
not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62,
145 L.Ed.2d 522, 120 S.Ct. 631 (2000).
To pursue a claim under the ADEA, plaintiffs must first exhaust administrative remedies by
raising the claim in a timely charge before the EEOC. 29 U.S.C. §626(d); Tyburski v. City of
Chicago, 964 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2020); Ajayi v. Aramark Business Services, Inc., 336 F.3d 520 (7th
Cir. 2003).
A. [5.16] Conduct Prohibited by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act outlaws five categories of conduct by covered
employers:
1. It is unlawful for an employer to refuse employment, discharge, or otherwise discriminate
against any individual regarding compensation or terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
if such action is taken because of the individual’s age. 29 U.S.C. §623(a)(1).
An employer is not, however, required by the ADEA to adopt a policy that will maximize the
number of older persons in its workforce, and an employer is entitled to make its own policies and
business judgments if the reasons are not based on age or a pretext for discrimination. O’Regan v.
Arbitration Forums, Inc., 246 F.3d 975, 984 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that courts “do not sit as a
kind of ‘super-personnel department’ weighing the prudence of employment decisions made by
firms charged with employment discrimination”), quoting Wollenburg v. Comtech Manufacturing
Co., 201 F.3d 973, 976 (7th Cir. 2000); O’Connor v. DePaul University, 123 F.3d 665, 670 (7th
Cir. 1997) (explaining that “[n]o matter how medieval a firm’s practices, no matter how highhanded its decisional process, no matter how mistaken the firm’s managers, [the ADEA does] not
interfere”), quoting Kralman v. Illinois Department of Veterans’ Affairs, 23 F.3d 150, 156 (7th Cir.
1994). To prove age discrimination, an employee must show that age was the but-for cause of the
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adverse employment action, not merely one of the motivating factors. Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 L.Ed.2d 119, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2350 – 2351 (2009). See also Babb
v. Wilkie, __ U.S. __, 140 S.Ct. 1168, 206 L.Ed.2d 432 (2020) (finding that but-for causation is not
required under ADEA’s federal-sector provision but is required for certain forms of relief).
2. It is unlawful for an employer to limit, segregate, or classify employees in a way that would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
an individual’s status as an employee because of age. 29 U.S.C. §623(a)(2).
3. If an employer is discriminatorily paying a younger employee more than an older employee
within the protected age group, it is unlawful for the employer to reduce the wage rate of the higherpaid employee. 29 U.S.C. §623(a)(3).
4. An employer is prohibited from discriminating against any of its employees or applicants
for employment for opposing any practice made unlawful by the ADEA or making a charge,
testifying, or otherwise participating in any proceeding under the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. §623(d).
5. It is unlawful for an employer to print or publish, or to cause to be printed or published,
any notice or advertisement relating to employment by that employer indicating any preference,
limitation, specification, or discrimination based on age. 29 U.S.C. §623(e).
Damages available to ADEA plaintiffs include backpay, benefits, and reinstatement. But see
Babb, supra (finding that but-for causation is required for certain forms of relief).
Under the ADEA’s two-tiered liability scheme, liquidated (double) damages are available to
plaintiffs when the ADEA violation is willful. 29 U.S.C. §626. A violation is not willful when an
employer “acted reasonably and in good faith in attempting to determine whether their [action]
would violate the ADEA.” Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 83 L.Ed.2d 523,
105 S.Ct. 613, 625 (1985). A violation is “willful” when “the employer either knew or showed
reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA.” 105 S.Ct.
at 625, quoting Air Line Pilots Association, International v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 713 F.2d
940, 956 (2d Cir. 1983). The difficulty has been — at least in the garden-variety case of an
employee challenging a particular employment action taken against him or her — that the employer
must be guilty of age animus to be held liable in the first instance. Anyone guilty of such intentional
age discrimination would ordinarily seem necessarily to have been at least reckless under the
Thurston standard, and therefore Thurston’s second tier seems to be more theoretical than
pragmatic. See Lindsey v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 810 F.2d 1094, 1100 (11th Cir. 1987)
(“There is no logical way to square a finding of intentional discrimination with a finding of good
faith on the employer’s part.”). Confronted with this dilemma, some post-Thurston courts devised
other tests for willfulness under the ADEA, thereby reinvigorating the second tier envisioned by
Thurston. See Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing cases
and holding that willful violation exists in disparate treatment claim if factfinder determines age
was predominant factor in employer’s decision).
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In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 123 L.Ed.2d 338, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 1709 (1993),
the Court rejected the alternative definitions of “willful” proposed by some courts of appeal and
reaffirmed the “willful” standard set out in Thurston. The Court in Hazen Paper, supra, held that
“[t]he ADEA does not provide for liquidated damages ‘where consistent with the principle of a
two-tiered liability scheme.’ It provides for liquidated damages where the violation was ‘willful.’ ”
Since this decision 75% to 80% of the cases involving liquidated damages where the
employer does not acknowledge making age-based decisions have upheld awards of
liquidated damages … while the balance have not…. In contrast, approximately 60%
of the cases prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hazen Paper involving liquidated
damages where the employer did not acknowledge making age-based decisions
upheld liquidated damage awards … while the balance did not…. Accordingly, the
percentage of cases found to involve non-willful violations has been reduced by half
or more after the decision in Hazen Paper. [Citations omitted.] Annot., 165 A.L.R. Fed.
1 (2000).
See also Mathis v. Phillips Chevrolet, Inc., 269 F.3d 771, 777 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding violation is
considered willful when “the employer knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether
its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA” (quoting Hazen Paper Co., supra, 113 S.Ct. at 1708);
explaining it is not necessary for plaintiff to show that “employer’s conduct was outrageous, or
provide direct evidence of the employer’s motivation”); Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System, 288 F.3d 296, 304 (7th Cir.
2002) (“An employer who truly violates the ADEA without knowing it and whose ignorance is not
reckless is protected from a finding of recklessness.”).
Frontpay is available in lieu of reinstatement at the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g.,
Mattenson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 438 F.3d 763, 771 (7th Cir. 2006) (upholding trial judge’s
decision not to award frontpay and noting that frontpay is equitable remedy for judge, not jury, to
determine); Price v. Marshall Erdman & Associates, Inc., 966 F.2d 320, 324 – 325 (7th Cir. 1992);
Sass v. MTA Bus Co., 6 F.Supp.3d 238, 251 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Price only stands for the
principle that a plaintiff is entitled to front pay in lieu of reinstatement, not that he was required to
elect the remedy of reinstatement prior to trial.”).
B. [5.17] Defenses to Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 Charges
There are six principal defenses to a claim against a covered employer under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act:
1. The challenged action or decision was not discriminatory on the basis of age.
2. The discharge or disciplinary action was for “good cause” as permitted by 29 U.S.C.
§623(f)(3). This defense is often the same as asserting that no age discrimination occurred.
3. The action is “based on reasonable factors other than age [(RFOA)].” 29 U.S.C. §623(f)(1).
This defense is available only to a claim of disparate impact. 29 C.F.R. §1625.7(d). The plaintiff
bears the burden of “isolating and identifying the specific employment practice that allegedly
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causes any observed statistical disparities.” 29 C.F.R. §1625.7(c). The employer bears the burdens
of production and persuasion to demonstrate an RFOA defense. 29 C.F.R. §1625.7(d). The
following is a non-exhaustive list of considerations that are relevant to determining whether a
practice is based on an RFOA:
(1) A reasonable factor other than age is a non-age factor that is objectively
reasonable when viewed from the position of a prudent employer mindful of its
responsibilities under the ADEA under like circumstances. . . . To establish the RFOA
defense, an employer must show that the employment practice was both reasonably
designed to further or achieve a legitimate business purpose and administered in a
way that reasonably achieves that purpose in light of the particular facts and
circumstances that were known, or should have been known, to the employer.
(2) Considerations that are relevant to whether a practice is based on a reasonable
factor other than age include, but are not limited to:
(i) The extent to which the factor is related to the employer’s stated business purpose;
(ii) The extent to which the employer defined the factor accurately and applied the
factor fairly and accurately, including the extent to which managers and supervisors
were given guidance or training about how to apply the factor and avoid
discrimination;
(iii) The extent to which the employer limited supervisors’ discretion to assess
employees subjectively, particularly where the criteria that the supervisors were
asked to evaluate are known to be subject to negative age-based stereotypes;
(iv) The extent to which the employer assessed the adverse impact of its employment
practice on older workers; and
(v) The degree of the harm to individuals within the protected age group, in terms of
both the extent of injury and the numbers of persons adversely affected, and the
extent to which the employer took steps to reduce the harm, in light of the burden of
undertaking such steps. 29 C.F.R. §1625.7(e).
Last and most notable, a differentiation based on the average cost of employing older employees
as a group is unlawful except with respect to employee benefit plans that qualify for the exception
to the ADEA found at 29 U.S.C. §623(f)(2). 29 C.F.R. §1625.7(f).
4. The challenged action or decision, although based on age, was based on a “bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business.”
29 U.S.C. §623(f)(1). “Bona fide occupational qualification” is a term of art subject to narrow
interpretation, and “[i]t is anticipated that this concept . . . will have limited scope and application.”
29 C.F.R. §1625.6(a). The burden of establishing a bona fide occupational qualification is on the
employer. Id.
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5. The action was taken pursuant to the terms of a bona fide seniority system as long as it was
not a subterfuge to evade the purpose of the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. §623(f)(2)(A).
6. The action was taken pursuant to the terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan in which,
for each benefit, the actual amount of payment made on behalf of the older worker is no less than
that made on behalf of a younger worker (see 29 C.F.R. §1625.10) or that is a voluntary early
retirement incentive plan consistent with the purposes of the ADEA (see 29 U.S.C. §623(f)(2)(B)).
The existence of an employee benefit plan, even if bona fide, cannot excuse the failure to hire any
individual, and no such employee benefit plan may require or permit the involuntary retirement of
an individual protected by the ADEA because of the individual’s age. Id. The exception is designed
to permit age-based reductions in benefit plans when those reductions are justified by significant
cost considerations. 29 C.F.R. §1625.10.

IV. AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967 STANDARDS IN
REDUCTION IN FORCE CASES
A. [5.18] Disparate Treatment
Traditionally, plaintiffs asserting wrongful termination under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act had two methods to prove their case by a preponderance of the evidence. The
plaintiff could provide direct proof of a discriminatory intent that motivated the adverse
employment decision. Andrews v. CBOCS West, Inc., 743 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 2014), overruled
in part by Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016); Radue v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 616 (7th Cir. 2000), overruled in part by Ortiz, supra. Such evidence may
include “the so-called ‘smoking gun’ — or circumstantial evidence which establishes a
discriminatory motive on the part of the employer through a longer chain of inferences.” Van
Antwerp v. City of Peoria, 627 F.3d 295, 298 (7th Cir. 2010). Alternatively, the plaintiff could
provide indirect proof that but-for age, he or she would not have been terminated. Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 L.Ed.2d 119, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009).
Under the indirect method of proof, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing
a prima facie case that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she performed
reasonably on the job in accord with her employers’ legitimate expectations, (3)
despite her reasonable performance, she was subjected to an adverse employment
action, and (4) similarly situated employees outside of her protected class were
treated more favorably by the employer. Andrews, supra, 743 F.3d at 234, quoting
Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hospital, 464 F.3d 691, 696 (7th Cir. 2006).
In 2016, however, in a ruling outside of the ADEA context, the Seventh Circuit rejected this
framework, overruling previous precedent separating direct from indirect evidence and applying
different legal standards to evidence based on those distinctions. Ortiz, supra, 834 F.3d at 765 –
766. In Ortiz, the Seventh Circuit expressed its frustration with the district court’s use of direct and
indirect evidence:
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The district court’s effort to shoehorn all evidence into two “methods,” and its
insistence that either method be implemented by looking for a “convincing mosaic,”
detracted attention from the sole question that matters: Whether a reasonable juror
could conclude that [the plaintiff] would have kept his job if he had a different
ethnicity, and everything else had remained the same. 834 F. 3d at 763 – 764.
The court also rejected previous precedent requiring plaintiffs to establish a “convincing mosaic”
of evidence showing discrimination, emphasizing that the convincing mosaic of evidence is not a
legal test.
That legal standard . . . is simply whether the evidence would permit a reasonable
factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other
proscribed factor caused the discharge or other adverse employment action. Evidence
must be considered as a whole, rather than asking whether any particular piece of
evidence proves the case by itself — or whether just the “direct” evidence does so, or
the “indirect” evidence. Evidence is evidence. Relevant evidence must be considered
and irrelevant evidence disregarded, but no evidence should be treated differently
from other evidence because it can be labeled “direct” or “indirect.” [Citation
omitted.] 834 F. 3d at 765.
The court sought to remove the “rat’s nest” of legal tests (834 F. 3d at 766) and bring “harmony”
to circuit law (834 F. 3d at 765).
While the Seventh Circuit overruled the disparate valuation of evidence based on whether it
was direct or indirect, the court did not eliminate the framework set out in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 36 L.Ed.2d 668, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (1973). Regarding the burden-shifting
framework, the court in Ortiz, supra, stated:
The burden-shifting framework created by McDonnell Douglas . . . sometimes is
referred to as an “indirect” means of proving employment discrimination. Today’s
decision does not concern McDonnell Douglas or any other burden-shifting
framework, no matter what it is called as a shorthand. We are instead concerned
about the proposition that evidence must be sorted into different piles, labeled
“direct” and “indirect,” that are evaluated differently. Instead, all evidence belongs
in a single pile and must be evaluated as a whole. That conclusion is consistent with
McDonnell Douglas and its successors. [Citation omitted.] 834 F. 3d at 766.
The Ortiz opinion did not incorporate the burden-shifting framework into its analysis. Instead, the
opinion evaluated evidence in a “pile” against the “reasonable juror” standard. 834 F. 3d at 766 –
767. While the court maintained that the burden-shifting framework survived, it did not provide
further instruction on how courts should treat the McDonnell Douglas framework going forward.
Under the typical McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, the plaintiff must prove the
various elements of a prima facie case. The burden then shifts to the employer to “articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its actions or decisions. McDonnell Douglas, supra, 93
S.Ct. at 1824. Once such a reason has been stated, the presumption of discrimination “drops from
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the case” (Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 101
S.Ct. 1089, 1095 n.10 (1981)), and the plaintiff’s burden of persuasion then requires him or her to
demonstrate that the employer’s stated reasons are a pretext for age discrimination (see St. Mary’s
Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 125 L.Ed.2d 407, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (1993)). Under the ADEA,
however, the burden does not shift to the employer to show that it would have taken action
regardless of age in ADEA claims. Gross, supra, 129 S.Ct. at 2351. Instead, a plaintiff asserting
wrongful termination under the ADEA bears the burden of persuasion to show that, “but for” age,
he or she would not have been terminated. Id. See also Babb v. Wilkie, __ U.S. __, 206 L.Ed.2d
432, 140 S.Ct. 1168 (2020) (finding that but-for causation is not required under ADEA’s federalsector provision, though it is required for certain forms of relief); Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507
U.S. 604, 123 L.Ed.2d 338, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 1706 (1993) (“In a disparate treatment case, liability
depends on whether the protected trait (under the ADEA, age) actually motivated the employer’s
decision.”); Schuster v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 327 F.3d 569 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that
employer’s proffered reasons for reduction in force, including need to make unit leaner and
financially independent to reduce costs and make unit more attractive to outside investors and to
eliminate management overlap and reduce overall workforce size, were legitimate and
nondiscriminatory); Thorn v. Sundstrand Aerospace Corp., 207 F.3d 383, 386 (7th Cir. 2000)
(applying McDonnell Douglas framework to claim under ADEA challenging layoff as part of RIF).
Although the Court in Gross, supra, 129 S.Ct. at 2349 n.2, noted that it had “not definitively
decided whether the evidentiary framework of McDonnell Douglas . . . utilized in Title VII cases
is appropriate in the ADEA context,” the Seventh Circuit has continued to apply the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework to ADEA claims. See Martino v. MCI Communications
Services, Inc., 574 F.3d 447, 455 (7th Cir. 2009) (applying burden shifting to ADEA claim postGross, but noting if plaintiff’s ADEA claim cannot survive summary judgment, it evaporates in
wake of Court’s decision in Gross; explaining plaintiff must prove that, but-for age, adverse action
would not have occurred); Guinto v. Exelon Generation Co., 341 Fed.Appx. 240, 245 n.2 (7th Cir.
2009) (applying burden shifting to ADEA action after Gross, but noting that parties presumed
burden shifting applied); Senske v. Sybase, Inc., 588 F.3d 501, 506 (7th Cir. 2009) (indicating in
dicta that burden shifting may apply to ADEA actions post-Gross); Magallanes v. Illinois Bell
Telephone Co., 728 F.Supp.2d 982, 997 (N.D.Ill. 2010) (noting that Seventh Circuit has long
applied burden-shifting methodology to ADEA cases pre-Gross and seems to continue to do so
even post-Gross); Yee v. UBS O’Connor, LLC, No. 07 C 7150, 2010 WL 1640192 (N.D.Ill. Apr.
22, 2010) (rejecting employer’s argument that Gross held burden shifting inapplicable to ADEA).
But see Kodish v. Oakbrook Terrace Fire Protection District, 604 F.3d 490, 501 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“Whether such a burden shifting analysis survives the Supreme Court’s declaration in Gross in
non-Title VII cases, remains to be seen.”).
Other circuits have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Westmoreland v. TWC
Administration LLC, 924 F.3d 718 (4th Cir. 2019) (concluding that Gross preserved use of
McDonnell Douglas framework for ADEA claims grounded in circumstantial evidence); Sims v.
MVM, Inc., 704 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2013) (concluding that it is appropriate to continue applying
McDonnell Douglas framework to ADEA cases post-Gross); Shelley v. Geren, 666 F.3d 599 (9th
Cir. 2012) (finding that Gross does not overrule using McDonnell Douglas framework to decide
summary judgment motions in ADEA cases); Tusing v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District, 639 F.3d 507, 515 n.3 (8th Cir. 2011) (concluding that McDonnell Douglas
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framework is likely still appropriate way to analyze ADEA pretext claims because it shifts only
burden of production); Jones v. Oklahoma City Public Schools, 617 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 2010)
(same); Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2010) (same); Jackson v.
Cal-Western Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2010) (following prior Fifth Circuit
precedent applying McDonnell Douglas to ADEA cases); Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684,
690 – 691 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding that but-for causation standard required by Gross does not conflict
with application of McDonnell Douglas framework to ADEA claims); Vélez v. Thermo King de
Puerto Rico, Inc., 585 F.3d 441, 447 n.2 (1st Cir. 2009) (acknowledging Gross and applying
McDonnell Douglas framework to ADEA claim); Geiger v. Tower Automotive, 579 F.3d 614, 622
(6th Cir. 2009) (explaining that McDonnell Douglas framework remains applicable to ADEA
claims post-Gross).
Following Ortiz, supra, the Seventh Circuit has used three general approaches to evaluating
evidence of discrimination, including evidence presented in ADEA cases. In some cases, the court
has performed its own Ortiz analysis of the entirety of the evidence without regard to the burdenshifting framework used by the district court. See, e.g., Williams v. Office of the Chief Judge of
Cook County, Illinois, 839 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2016). Other times, the court has simultaneously
applied both the Ortiz and McDonnell Douglas approaches, usually following the McDonnell
Douglas framework while applying Ortiz at the end of each factor or step in the burden-shifting
framework. See, e.g., Harris v. Office of Chief Judge of Circuit Court of Cook County, 673
Fed.Appx. 537 (7th Cir. 2016). Finally, in other cases, the Seventh Circuit has bifurcated the
analyses, reviewing the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework in isolation before moving
to a separate Ortiz inquiry. See David v. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508,
846 F.3d 216 (7th Cir. 2017). But see Burton v. Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System,
851 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2017) (identifying evidence as circumstantial to framing Ortiz standard
and asking whether reasonable factfinder could infer forbidden factor was but-for causal link to
adverse employment action in absence of direct evidence); Cole v. Board of Trustees of Northern
Illinois University, 838 F.3d 888, 899 – 900 (7th Cir. 2016) (exchanging direct-indirect dichotomy
for direct-circumstantial dichotomy).
Most decisions apply both methods — either through the simultaneous or bifurcated
approach — and many decisions expressly acknowledge doing so to accommodate lower courts or
plaintiffs that use the burden-shifting framework. See, e.g., Reid v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 274
F.Supp.3d 817, 822 (N.D.Ill. 2017). This raises the question of whether courts will incorporate the
burden-shifting framework only when the plaintiff or lower court relies on it, or whether courts will
continue to reference and apply the burden-shifting framework even if the plaintiff or lower court
has instead relied on Ortiz alone. For now, parties who relied on the burden-shifting framework in
their pleadings or who received a lower court judgment relying on McDonnell Douglas should
anticipate an analysis on appeal that includes both McDonnell Douglas’s framework and Ortiz’s
reasonable juror standard. See Brown v. DS Services of America, Inc., 246 F.Supp.3d 1206, 1217
(N.D.Ill. 2017). This includes ADEA claims, as courts have applied Ortiz consistently across all
types of claims, including claims under the ADEA (see, e.g., David, supra, 846 F.3d at 226) and in
at least one RIF case (see Brown, supra, 246 F.Supp.3d at 1216).
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District courts have most often followed the approaches used by the Seventh Circuit:
1. applying Ortiz alone (see, e.g., Scales v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., No. 15 C
50038, 2017 WL 345576 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 24, 2017); Edwards v. Illinois Department of
Financial & Professional Regulation, 210 F.Supp.3d 931 (N.D.Ill. 2016); Cannon v.
General Supply & Services, Inc., No. 15-cv-06982, 2016 WL 7339151 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 19,
2016));
2. applying Ortiz and McDonnell Douglas simultaneously (see, e.g., Wyman v. Evgeros, Inc.,
No. 15 C 2758, 2017 WL 386651 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 27, 2017)); or
3. using a bifurcated approach that applies McDonnell Douglas and then Ortiz (see, e.g.,
Santangelo v. Crown Cork & Seal USA, Inc., 255 F.Supp.3d 791 (N.D.Ill. 2017); Dickey
v. McDonald, 238 F.Supp.3d 1068 (N.D.Ill. 2017)).
The bifurcated analysis is the most popular approach to date.
In applying Ortiz simultaneously with McDonnell Douglas, most courts organize the opinion
by the McDonnell Douglas factors and conclude each factor and step of the burden-shifting
framework with Ortiz’s reasonable juror standard. However, district courts have also combined the
analyses entirely, either omitting reference to both approaches (see, e.g., Chumbley v. Board of
Education for Peoria District 150, 220 F.Supp.3d 915, 922 (C.D.Ill. Dec. 9, 2016)), or explicitly
referring to both Ortiz and McDonnell (see, e.g., Kawczynski v. F.E. Moran, Inc., 238 F.Supp.3d
1076 (N.D.Ill. 2017) (appeal filed)). Those courts using the bifurcated approach acknowledge that
other types of evidence traditionally excluded from McDonnell Douglas can now be considered
under Ortiz. See David, supra, 846 F.3d at 227 – 228 (discussing employer’s failure to process
forms prior to retirement, supervisor’s mention of retirement during discussion about title change
and pay raise, and lack of credible reasons for pay raise); Zegarra v. John Crane, Inc., 218
F.Supp.3d 655, 670 (N.D.Ill. 2016) (suggesting timing of workplace incident and adverse action
could be considered for ADEA claims).
Some district courts have embraced the logic of David, supra, finding new patterns of
organizing and evaluating evidence. See, e.g., White v. Campanelli, No. 1:14-cv-7215, 2017 WL
528380 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 9, 2017) (turning to Ortiz as safety net for “other evidence” that “informs the
holistic inquiry” which is not typically used in McDonnell Douglas). Since Ortiz merely provides
that all evidence must be evaluated on a level playing field without any privileged categories, such
novel approaches are presumably appropriate as long as they evaluate the evidence as a whole.
B. [5.19] Reduction in Force Prima Facie Case: Disparate Treatment
“[T]he McDonnell Douglas formula for determining the proprietary of summary judgment in
an employment discrimination case is applicable to RIFs.” Thorn v. Sundstrand Aerospace Corp.,
207 F.3d 383, 386 (7th Cir. 2000). A terminated plaintiff can establish a prima facie case for an
Age Discrimination in Employment Act violation in the context of a reduction in force by showing
that (1) the employee was within the protected age group, (2) the employee was performing
according to the employer’s legitimate expectations, (3) the employee was terminated, and (4)
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similarly situated younger employees were treated more favorably. Testerman v. EDS Technical
Products Corp., 98 F.3d 297, 303 (7th Cir. 1996); Oxman v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448, 455 (7th Cir.
1988). See also O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 134 L.Ed.2d 433,
116 S.Ct. 1307, 1310 (1996) (“Because the ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis of age and
not class membership, the fact that a replacement is substantially younger than the plaintiff is a far
more reliable indicator of age discrimination than is the fact that the plaintiff was replaced by
someone outside the protected class.”). “The Seventh Circuit has defined ‘substantially younger’
as generally ten years younger.” Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine Division of Coltec
Industries, 328 F.3d 309, 322 (7th Cir. 2003). See also U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. 02 C 4672, 2006 WL 1343173, *5 n.8 (N.D.Ill. May
11, 2006) (stating that Hartley v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc., 124 F.3d 887 (7th Cir.1997), did not hold
that “an age difference of fewer than ten years completely forecloses an age discrimination claim”);
Schulz v. Varian Medical Systems, Inc., 315 F.Supp.2d 923, 934 (N.D.Ill. 2004) (concluding that if
age difference is less than ten years, plaintiff must “direct[] the court to evidence that her employer
considered her age to be significant”), quoting Hartley, supra, 124 F.3d at 893.
In RIF cases, when the plaintiff is not replaced, the McDonnell Douglas formula is modified
slightly.
The plaintiff must present satisfactory evidence either that someone else (in an agediscrimination case, someone much younger than the plaintiff) . . . is now doing the
work he was doing; or, if the work itself has vanished — maybe the entire division in
which he worked was closed down — that the employer found a job elsewhere in the
company for a much younger person who had also lost his job when the division was
shut down. [Citations omitted.] Thorn, supra, 207 F.3d at 386.
See also Showalter v. University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, 190 F.3d 231, 235 (3d Cir. 1999).
Cf. Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 494 (7th Cir. 2000); Beaird v. Seagate Technology
Inc., 145 F.3d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 1998). By and large, however, the Seventh Circuit has
explained on several occasions . . . that the fundamental analysis of RIF cases is no
different from the analysis appropriate to other forms of discrimination. . . .
Conceptually, one can think of a RIF as a situation . . . in which the employer decides
whom from a defined group it will “re-hire” or retain, considering all existing
employees as roughly like applicants for retention. [Citations omitted.] Adams v.
Ameritech Services, Inc., 231 F.3d 414, 422 (7th Cir. 2000).
The Seventh Circuit has also made a distinction between a “mini-RIF” and a RIF. A mini-RIF
involves the frequently occurring situation in which a dismissed worker’s duties are absorbed by
another employee rather than eliminated. In this situation, the Seventh Circuit uses the following
modified version of the McDonnell Douglas framework: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected
class; (2) the plaintiff was meeting the employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) the plaintiff suffered
an adverse employment action; and (4) the plaintiff’s duties were absorbed by employees not in the
protected class. Merillat v. Metal Spinners, Inc., 470 F.3d 685, 690 (7th Cir. 2006); Johal v. Little
Lady Foods, Inc., 434 F.3d 943, 946 (7th Cir. 2006); Michas v. Health Cost Controls of Illinois,
Inc., 209 F.3d 687, 693 – 694 (7th Cir. 2000).
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Occasionally, employers that are in a perilous financial situation deny raises or bonuses to
employees but do not lay them off. The Seventh Circuit has rejected the argument “that the denial
of a [salary] raise (and we suppose a fortiori the denial of perks) is not an ‘adverse employment
action.’ ” Hunt v. City of Markham, Illinois, 219 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 2000). But see Davis v.
New York City Department of Education, 804 F.3d 231, 236 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that employer’s
denial or reduction of discretionary bonus could constitute adverse employment action).
The requirement of more favorable treatment of persons similarly situated should not be
overlooked. See, e.g., Glover v. U.S. Healthworks, 326 Fed.Appx. 964 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that
employees over 40 who were terminated in RIF and whose duties were absorbed by person under
40 failed to establish ADEA claims when employee (1) failed to present any evidence about
employees who were retained and (2) did not present evidence that RIF was pretextual or that
employer did not honestly perceive plaintiff to be weaker performer than another employee who
was retained). The purpose of the “similarly situated” requirement is
to determine whether there are enough common factors between a plaintiff and a
comparator — and few enough confounding ones — to allow for a meaningful
comparison in order to divine whether discrimination was at play. Barricks v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 481 F.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2007).
In RIF cases,
plaintiffs [are] required to show at a minimum that the [allegedly similarly situated]
employees possessed analogous attributes, experience, education, and qualifications
relevant to the positions sought, and that the younger employees obtained the desired
positions around the same time as the RIF. Raymond v. Ameritech Corp., 442 F.3d 600,
610 – 611 (7th Cir. 2006), quoting Radue v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 219 F.3d 612, 618 (7th
2000), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th
Cir. 2016).
Likewise, the similarly situated person must be outside the protected class. See, e.g., Martino
v. MCI Communications Services, Inc., 574 F.3d 447, 454 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding fourth prong
not met in ADEA RIF case in which number of younger employees were let go at same time as
plaintiff, and noting that “[i]t’s hard to make out a case for age discrimination when younger
workers are also being shown the door”); Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc., 476 F.3d 487 (7th
Cir. 2007) (holding ADEA claim failed when duties absorbed by person over 40), overruled on
other grounds by Ortiz, supra.
C. [5.20] Proof of Discriminatory Intent/Pretext: Disparate Treatment
Once a prima facie case is established, the burden of production is shifted to the employer to
articulate “legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons” for its actions. Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1095 (1981). To meet this burden
of production, an employer must merely articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
its actions or decisions. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 36 L.Ed.2d 668, 93
S.Ct. 1817 (1973). Once such a reason has been stated, the presumption of discrimination “drops
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from the case” (Burdine, supra, 101 S.Ct. at 1095 n.10), and the plaintiff’s burden of persuasion
then requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the employer’s stated reasons are a pretext for age
discrimination (see St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 125 L.Ed.2d 407, 113 S.Ct.
2742 (1993)). This burden of establishing pretext is usually the real difficulty faced by plaintiffs.
In Hicks, supra, 113 S.Ct. at 2749, the Court settled a long-standing federal appellate court
split, holding that a Title VII plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the
employer’s asserted reasons for its employment decisions are rejected by the trier of fact. Instead,
a plaintiff must show “both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.”
[Emphasis in original.] 113 S.Ct. at 2752. While rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons “will
permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination,” it does not compel
judgment for the plaintiff. [Emphasis in original.] 113 S.Ct. at 2749. Doing so
disregards the fundamental principle of [Federal Rule of Evidence] 301 that a
presumption does not shift the burden of proof, and ignores [the Court’s] repeated
admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the “ultimate burden of
persuasion.” Id.
In other words, even though “rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons is enough at law to
sustain a finding of discrimination, there must be a finding of discrimination.” [Emphasis in
original.] 113 S.Ct. at 2749 n.4. See also Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1123
(7th Cir. 1994), in which the court opined that
the holding in Hicks is that a plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law
simply because she proves her prima facie case and shows that the employer’s
proffered reasons for her discharge are false. The next logical question is whether the
plaintiff may prevail, not automatically as a matter of law, but through submission of
her case to the ultimate factfinder, under such circumstances.
Hicks answers this question in the affirmative.
The Supreme Court subsequently extended this reasoning to the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act in its decision in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133,
147 L.Ed.2d 105, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000). Specifically, “[i]n appropriate circumstances, the trier of
fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to
cover up a discriminatory purpose.” 120 S.Ct. at 2108. The Court cautioned, however, that such a
showing by a plaintiff will not always be adequate if “no rational factfinder could conclude that the
action was discriminatory.” 120 S.Ct. at 2109. The Seventh Circuit applied this reasoning in
Appelbaum v. Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District, 340 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2003). The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court, finding sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to
disbelieve the company’s proffered reason for its actions. Citing Reeves, supra, the court held that
if the jury disbelieved the company’s reason for its action, then the jury was entitled to infer that
the employer used the disbelieved reason as “a cloak for age discrimination.” 340 F.3d at 579.
Evidence that the court deemed sufficient consisted of (1) the company’s shifting explanation for
its actions, (2) a prior reduction in force in which the plaintiff was selected for layoff (but ultimately
not laid off) despite the fact that there was a poorer performing younger employee who could have
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been selected instead, and (3) lesser discipline imposed on a similarly situated younger employee.
340 F.3d at 580 – 581. On this thin evidence, the court allowed the jury verdict against the company
to stand. See also Henderson v. Shulkin, 720 Fed.Appx. 776 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding that employer’s
shifting explanations for not hiring plaintiff, among other evidence, could be sufficient to infer
pretext).
In spite of this, plaintiffs would be well-advised to plead and to prove both that the defendant’s
asserted reasons are false and that discrimination was the true motivating factor. See, e.g., Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 123 L.Ed.2d 338, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 1706 – 1708 (1993) (stating
that liability under ADEA depends on whether age “actually motivated the employer’s decision”
and hesitating to infer age-based animus solely “from the implausibility of the employer’s
explanation”); Pilditch v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 3 F.3d 1113, 1117 (7th Cir. 1993)
(finding that, under Hicks, supra, plaintiff must prove reasons offered are fake and also that true
reason for firing was discriminatory).
In analyzing pretext, the question is not whether the employer’s decision was “right or wrong,
but only ‘whether the reason for which the [employer] discharged the [employee] was
discriminatory.’ ” Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine Division of Coltec Industries, 328 F.3d
309, 324 (7th Cir. 2003), quoting Giannopoulos v. Brach & Brock Confections, Inc., 109 F.3d 406,
410 (7th Cir. 1997). Courts have readily accepted reasonable management judgments, even if they
were in error, misguided, or otherwise bad business decisions. See Merillat v. Metal Spinners, Inc.,
470 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that “[e]ven if [employer’s] decision was, in retrospect,
a mistake, that conclusion, made with the benefit of hindsight, does not mean that [employer]
honestly did not believe that retaining [another employee] and terminating [plaintiff] was the
appropriate decision at the time it was made”); Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hospital, 464 F.3d 691, 697
(7th Cir. 2006) (holding that “[f]ederal courts have authority to correct an adverse employment
action only where the employer’s decision is unlawful, and not merely when the adverse action is
unwise or even unfair”); Holmberg v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 901 F.2d 1387, 1392 (7th Cir.
1990) (“While management’s poor business judgment may be a concern for shareholders, it does
not give rise to a claim for employment discrimination.”); Komel v. Jewel Cos., 874 F.2d 472, 474
(7th Cir. 1989) (noting that courts do not “sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an
entity’s business decisions,” quoting Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 464 (7th Cir.
1986)); Smith v. General Scanning, Inc., 876 F.2d 1315, 1321 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that “it is
not our purpose to second-guess an employer’s good faith business decision”); Kephart v. Institute
of Gas Technology, 630 F.2d 1217, 1223 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding that ADEA “was not intended as
a vehicle for judicial review of business decisions” and courts “will not inquire into the defendant’s
method of conducting its business”).
When job performance is among the considerations used in conducting a RIF, plaintiffs may
argue that the RIF was not actually driven by economics and was thus pretextual. Just because the
employee’s job performance was adequate does not necessarily mean that the defendant’s
explanation is a pretext for age discrimination. Gustovich v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 972 F.2d
845, 848 (7th Cir. 1992). Instead,
plaintiffs [must] come up with evidence implying that the performance evaluations
had been “cooked” in order to do in the older workers. One method would [be] to
show that the managers expressed discriminatory attitudes, or acted in
discriminatory ways, on other occasions. Id.
5 — 36
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Further, normal discharge criteria are modified slightly in the RIF and mini-RIF contexts. In a
RIF or mini-RIF, even though an employee’s performance may be satisfactory, “it does not mean
that [the employee’s] termination as part of a RIF was discriminatory.” Merillat, supra, 470 F.3d
at 693. The Seventh Circuit has recognized that, even if an employee would not have been fired
under normal circumstances, “[i]n a reduction in force, someone has to go. It is usually the least
qualified or least productive employee.” Fairchild v. Forma Scientific, Inc., 147 F.3d 567, 573 (7th
Cir. 1998). See also Balderston, supra, 328 F.3d at 324 (holding that plaintiff did not demonstrate
pretext when there was no evidence to show that employer “did not honestly believe [it] was
dismissing a poorer performing, less suitable” employee in RIF).
Although the inquiry into discriminatory intent and/or falsity is fact-specific, among the
activities that have been found to constitute sufficient evidence of discriminatory age animus are
the following:
1. a post-RIF change in job titles while the RIF’d employee’s job functions continued
unchanged (Franci v. Avco Corp., 538 F.Supp. 250 (D.Conn. 1982); but cf. Sahadi v.
Reynolds Chemical, Division of Hoover Ball & Bearing Co., 636 F.2d 1116, 1117 (6th Cir.
1980); Grabb v. Bendix Corp., 666 F.Supp. 1223 (N.D.Ind. 1986));
2. derogatory comments about age (Franci, supra; see also Ezell v. Potter, 400 F.3d 1041
(7th Cir. 2005) (finding evidence sufficient to withstand summary judgment when there
was evidence that decision-maker had plan to eliminate older workers because decisionmaker believed older workers were slower than younger workers; evidence decision-maker
frequently commented on plaintiff’s gray hair and slow speed)); Stumph v. Thomas &
Skinner, Inc., 770 F.2d 93, 94 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting statement by defendant president that
company “was going to have to get rid of some of its older employees and get a young,
aggressive organization in place for when the economy turned around”); but see Monaco
v. Fuddruckers, Inc., 1 F.3d 658, 660 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Unless the remarks upon which
plaintiff relies were related to the employment decision in question, they cannot be
evidence of a discriminatory discharge.”), quoting McCarthy v. Kemper Life Insurance
Cos., 924 F.2d 683, 686 – 687 (7th Cir. 1991); Bechold v. IGW Systems, Inc., 817 F.2d
1282, 1286 (7th Cir. 1987) (referring to employees as “older” and “outdated” is not
necessarily evidence of discriminatory intent when shown to be objective observation and
not stereotype or generalization). Mere stray remarks, however, have been rejected as proof
of discriminatory intent in a number of cases. See, e.g., Cullen v. Olin Corp., 195 F.3d 317,
323 (7th Cir. 1999); Cianci v. Pettibone Corp., 152 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 1998). See also
Bahl v. Royal Indemnity Co., 115 F.3d 1283, 1293 (7th Cir. 1997); Rush v. McDonald’s
Corp., 966 F.2d 1104, 1116 (7th Cir. 1992). But see Hatch v. Brillion School District, Case
No. 16-C-802, 2018 WL 3349004 (E.D.Wis. July 9, 2018) (finding that derogatory
comments made during performance review were evidence of discriminatory mindset
where there was no independent justification for non-renewal of contract).
The fact that someone expressed discriminatory feelings but was not involved in the
employment decision of which the plaintiff complains is not evidence that the decision had
a discriminatory motivation. That is simple common sense. It is different when the
decision-makers themselves, or those who provide input into the decision, express such
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feelings around the time of and in reference to the adverse employment action of which
there is a complaint. E.g., Ezell, supra; Bellaver v. Quanex Corp., 200 F.3d 485, 493 (7th
Cir. 2000); Hunt v. City of Markham, Illinois, 219 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir. 2000); Stone v.
Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132, 1140 (10th Cir. 2000); Vance v. Union Planters Corp.,
209 F.3d 438, 442 (5th Cir. 2000); Pitasi v. Gartner Group, Inc., 184 F.3d 709, 714 – 715
(7th Cir. 1999); Bahl, supra; Cheek v. Peabody Coal Co., 97 F.3d 200, 203 (7th Cir. 1996).
In the latter situation, it may be possible to infer that the decision-makers were influenced
by those feelings in making their decisions.); and
3. belatedly asserting a new reason for the plaintiff’s termination during the after-the-fact
defense of an age discrimination claim (see Graefenhain v. Pabst Brewing Co., 827 F.2d
13, 21 (7th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 860
F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Giacoletto v. Amax Zinc Co., 954 F.2d 424, 427 (7th Cir.
1992) (finding employer’s implementation shortly before termination of subjective
employment decision contradicted objective evidence)).
D. [5.21] Mixed Motives
The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the mixed-motive framework for Age Discrimination in
Employment Act cases. Accordingly, unlike in the Title VII context, employers may not avoid
liability by proving that they would have made the same decision in question absent any
discriminatory intent. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 156 L.Ed.2d 84, 123 S.Ct.
2148 (2003) (Title VII) (eliminating the Price Waterhouse requirement that plaintiffs put forth
“direct evidence” in mixed-motive cases to shift the burden of proof to the employer (citing Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 104 L.Ed.2d 268, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (1989)); Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 104 L.Ed.2d 268, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (1989) (same). In Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 L.Ed.2d 119, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2350 – 2351 (2009), the
Court held that the mixed-motive framework has no application to the ADEA, which is also unlike
Title VII because it is a different statutory mechanism, enacted for different purposes, with
altogether different language. Accordingly, the Court held
that a plaintiff bringing a disparate-treatment claim pursuant to the ADEA must
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the “but-for” cause of the
challenged adverse employment action. The burden of persuasion does not shift to the
employer to show that it would have taken the action regardless of age, even when a
plaintiff has produced some evidence that age was one motivating factor in that
decision. 129 S.Ct. at 2352.
Even though the Supreme Court has held that the mixed-motive framework has no application
to ADEA claims and that an ADEA plaintiff must prove age was a but-for cause, this does not
preclude a plaintiff from pleading ADEA claims and Title VII claims in the alternative. See, e.g.,
Igasaki v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 988 F.3d 948 (7th Cir.
2021) (considering multiple potential theories of discrimination); Pride v. Illinois Department of
Human Services, No. 12 cv 5740, 2013 WL 139881, *2 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 10, 2013) (holding that Gross,
supra, does not preclude ADEA plaintiff from bringing claims based on other types of
discrimination). For example, in Babych v. Psychiatric Solutions, Inc., No. 09 C 8000, 2010 WL
3547981, *2 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 7, 2010), the court concluded that
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Gross has nothing to say about pleading claims in the alternative. Although a jury
may not be given a mixed motives instruction for the ADEA claim, it may be
instructed to consider each of [the] plaintiff’s claims on its merits.
Similarly, the court in Anbudaiyan v. State of Illinois Department of Financial & Professional
Regulation, No. 11 C 8893, 2012 WL 2525696, *3 (N.D.Ill. June 29, 2012), denied a motion to
dismiss an ADEA claim, holding that the plaintiff has “not ‘pled himself out of court’ by asserting
alternative claims of discrimination. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(d)(2) permits a party to
pursue alternative claims.”
E. [5.22] Disparate Impact
Disparate impact claims are also available under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, 544 U.S. 228, 161 L.Ed.2d 410, 125 S.Ct. 1536 (2005).
Claims of disparate impact allow recovery for “employment practices that are facially neutral in
their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and
cannot be justified by business necessity.” International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 52 L.Ed.2d 396, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1854 n.15 (1977). A disparate impact challenge to a
reduction in force would essentially assert that a RIF violates the ADEA because it has the effect,
however unintended, of disproportionately and negatively impacting persons over the age of 40.
See, e.g., Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, 554 U.S. 84, 171 L.Ed.2d 283, 128 S.Ct.
2395, 2398 – 2399 (2008).
In recognizing the viability of such a claim, the Court in City of Jackson, supra, 125 S.Ct. at
1544 – 1545, was careful to hold that, while a disparate impact claim is cognizable under the
ADEA, the scope of liability under the ADEA is narrower than under Title VII. The reason for this
is that the ADEA, unlike Title VII, affords employers the “reasonable factors other than age”
defense. The Court reasoned:
Congress’ decision to limit the coverage of the ADEA by including the RFOA
provision is consistent with the fact that age, unlike race or other classifications
protected by Title VII, not uncommonly has relevance to an individual’s capacity to
engage in certain types of employment. . . . Thus, it is not surprising that certain
employment criteria that are routinely used may be reasonable despite their adverse
impact on older workers as a group. 125 S.Ct. at 1545.
Based on the RFOA provision and the foregoing rationale, the Court held that the businessnecessity test applicable to Title VII disparate impact cases is not applicable in the ADEA context;
rather, the appropriate test is for reasonableness such that the employer is not liable under the
ADEA for a disparate impact on older workers as long as the challenged employment action, in
relying on specific non-age factors, constitutes a reasonable means to the employer’s legitimate
goals. See City of Jackson, supra, 125 S.Ct. at 1546; Meacham, supra, 128 S.Ct. at 2404. In
Meacham, supra, the Court explained that the RFOA defense is still nonetheless an affirmative
defense for which the employer bears the burdens of production and persuasion. See also O’Brien
v. Caterpillar Inc., 900 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2018) (finding that employer satisfied its “relatively
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light” burden of showing that its liquidation plan was based on reasonable factors other than age);
Carson v. Lake County, Indiana, 865 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding that RFOA defense barred
disparate impact claims because employer took adverse action to preserve its supplemental
insurance plan for retirees and comply with federal law, not because employees were over 65).
To state a disparate impact claim adequately under the ADEA, plaintiffs must identify the
specific policy or practice that they allege is responsible for the disparate impact. As the Court
further explained in Meacham:
[A] plaintiff falls short by merely alleging a disparate impact, or “point[ing] to a
generalized policy that leads to such an impact.”. . . The plaintiff is obliged to do
more: to “isolat[e] and identif[y] the specific employment practices that are allegedly
responsible for any observed statistical disparities. . . . The aim of this requirement,
as City of Jackson said, is to avoid the “result [of] employers being potentially liable
for ‘the myriad of innocent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances.’ ”. . . And
as the outcome in that case shows, the requirement has bite: one sufficient reason for
rejecting the employees’ challenge was that they “ha[d] done little more than point
out that the pay plan at issue [was] relatively less generous to older workers than to
younger workers,” and “ha[d] not identified any specific test, requirement, or
practice within the pay plan that ha[d] an adverse impact on older workers.”
[Emphasis in original.] [Citations omitted.] 128 S.Ct. at 2405 – 2406, quoting City of
Jackson, supra, 125 S.Ct. at 1545.
See also O’Brien, supra (finding actionable policy because liquidation plan applied same rules to
hundreds of employees and caused significant age-based disparities); Stamm v. Inter-Con Security
Systems, Inc., No. 09-1374, 2010 WL 2663079, *2 (C.D.Ill. June 29, 2010) (dismissing ADEA
disparate impact claim in which plaintiff did “not even identify a generalized policy of Defendant,
much less isolate and identify specific employment practices that are responsible for any observed
statistical disparities or any specific test, requirement, or practice of one of Defendant’s policies”);
Combs v. Grand Victoria Casino & Resort, No. 1:08-cv-00414-RLY-JMS, 2008 WL 4452460, *3
(S.D.Ind. Sept. 30, 2008) (granting motion to dismiss with respect to ADEA disparate impact claim
because plaintiffs failed to point to specific employment practice to support their disparate impact
claims and because plaintiffs’ “vague claims of subjective decision-making cannot be considered
a ‘specific test, requirement, or practice’ ”), quoting City of Jackson, supra, 125 S.Ct. at 1545. But
see Chicago Regional Council of Carpenters, United Brotherhood Carpenters & Joiners of
America v. Berglund Construction Co., No. 12 C 3604, 2012 WL 3023422, *3 (N.D.Ill. July 24,
2012) (holding that plaintiff adequately pleaded ADEA disparate impact claim when plaintiff
alleged he was member of protected class of workers over 40, that employer’s policy requirement
had impermissible impact on carpenter applicants over 40, and specifically that of eight carpenter
applicants who failed the requirement, six of them were over 40).
See §5.17 above for a discussion of the ADEA regulations regarding the RFOA defense.
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F. [5.23] Wage Discrimination
Some employers have considered undertaking a reduction in force to reduce or eliminate
personnel expenses, such as wages and fringe benefits. It is generally well-settled in the Seventh
Circuit that employers may make personnel decisions based on reducing the cost of their payroll
without immediately running afoul of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
Compensation is typically correlated with age, just as pension benefits are. The
correlation, however, is not perfect. . . . “Because age and . . . [compensation levels]
are analytically distinct, an employer can take account of one while ignoring the other,
and thus it is incorrect to say that a decision based on . . . compensation level is
necessarily ‘age-based.’ ” Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1126 (7th
Cir. 1994), quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 123 L.Ed.2d 338, 113 S.Ct.
1701, 1707 (1993).
Without more, considering characteristics other than age that are correlated with age, such as
years of service or the vesting of pension benefits, does not violate the ADEA. Hazen, supra. In
Hazen, 113 S.Ct. at 1707 – 1708, the Court held that employers may discharge employees to prevent
the vesting of pension benefits without violating the ADEA. The Court reasoned that the ADEA
requires an employer to ignore only an employee’s age and does not specify further characteristics
that an employer must also ignore. Id. Similarly, in Anderson, supra, 13 F.3d at 1125 – 1126, the
Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff could not prove age discrimination even if the employer
discharged him based wholly on a desire to reduce salary costs. Moreover, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s regulations regarding the “reasonable factors other than age” defense
provide that, in the disparate impact setting,
[a] differentiation based on the average cost of employing older employees as a group
is unlawful except with respect to employee benefit plans which qualify for the section
4(f)(2) [29 U.S.C. §623(f)(2)] exception to the [ADEA]. 29 C.F.R. §1625.7(f).
Such action may, however, be actionable under §510 of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act. See 29 U.S.C. §1140. Further, an employer who targets employees with a particular
pension status on the assumption that those employees are likely to be older engages in age
discrimination, as “[p]ension status may be a proxy for age, not in the sense that the ADEA makes
the two factors equivalent . . . but in the sense that the employer may suppose a correlation between
the two factors and act accordingly.” [Citation omitted.] Hazen, supra, 113 S.Ct. at 1707. See also
Tramp v. Associated Underwriters, Inc., 768 F.3d 793, 800 – 803 (8th Cir. 2014) (finding genuine
issues of fact as to whether desire to reduce insurance premiums was proxy for age).

V. PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS
A. [5.24] Reduction in Force Procedures
An employer who is not able to eliminate shifts or jobs but must instead select individuals for
layoff by job classification or department cannot take the same advantage of the business-judgment
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rule and thus faces a more difficult task. In such a situation, the employer must be sure that the
layoff procedures are carefully thought out and that reasons for particular layoff decisions can be
clearly articulated and supported by evidence. For an example of a relatively extensive reduction
in force policy, see Grabb v. Bendix Corp., 666 F.Supp. 1223 (N.D.Ind. 1986).
Also, as noted in §5.23 above, §510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (29
U.S.C. §1140) prohibits the suspension, discipline, or discharge of an employee for the purpose of
interfering with the attainment of rights under ERISA-covered plans, such as retirement plans.
Thus, in Gavalik v. Continental Can Co., 812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1987), the Third Circuit held that
the defendant’s liability avoidance program constituted a violation of ERISA. The defendant, to
reduce its unfunded pension exposure, adopted a corporate liability avoidance program having two
goals: (1) to lay off employees who had not yet become eligible for pensions and (2) to retain
employees whose benefits had already vested. 812 F.2d at 841 – 842. To achieve these goals, the
defendant adopted a “cap and shrink” program, whereby employment at a plant was capped at a
maximum number and then allowed to shrink through attrition. 812 F.2d at 840. The defendant
designated as “permanently laid off” all employees below the cap line and tailored its business
volume to meet the capped level of employment. Id. The court found that this program was
discriminatory. 812 F.2d at 865.
B. [5.25] Performance Appraisals/Statistics
On balance, perhaps the best way to select those employees to be laid off in a particular job
classification or department is through a performance appraisal system. To withstand scrutiny,
however, the performance appraisal system must be neutral in terms of protected categories.
Performance appraisal systems can most readily be defended in court against discrimination
charges if they meet the following four qualifications shared by appraisal systems that have
successfully survived such challenges:
1. individuals responsible for evaluating employees were given specific written instructions
on how to complete the appraisal;
2. appraisals were made using a system that was behavior-oriented rather than trait-oriented
(i.e., the appraisals were based primarily on objective as opposed to subjective criteria);
3. job analysis was used to develop the content of the appraisal system; and
4. results of the appraisal were reviewed with each employee.
See Hubert S. Feild and William H. Holley, The Relationship of Performance Appraisal System
Characteristics to Verdicts in Selected Employment Discrimination Cases, 25 Acad.Mgmt.J. 392
(1982). See also Daily Lab.Rep. (BNA) at E-1 (Dec. 26, 1984) (discussing follow-up study by
Professor Feild, analyzing sample of 31 court decisions to confirm this finding).
Once the weakest performers are identified via the performance appraisal process, the employer
should perform a statistical analysis to determine whether there is going to be a statistically
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significant adverse impact against any protected group. The most widely used and recognized
method for statistical analysis is the standard deviation analysis. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled
that if an employer is within two, or possibly even three, standard deviations of the expected norm
under this formula, then there is no statistically significant adverse impact on the protected group.
Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 53 L.Ed.2d 768, 97 S.Ct. 2736 (1977).
Some courts, however, have indicated that statistics may be of qualified significance in the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act setting. Unlike race or sex discrimination cases, courts have
acknowledged in age discrimination that
in the usual case, absent any discriminatory intent, discharged employees will more
often than not be replaced by those younger than they, for older employees are
constantly moving out of the labor market, while younger ones move in. Dorsch v. L.B.
Foster Co., 782 F.2d 1421, 1427 n.6 (7th Cir. 1986), quoting Kephart v. Institute of Gas
Technology, 630 F.2d 1217, 1224 (7th Cir. 1980).
Thus, statistical disparities may have to reach a heightened level of significance to be viewed as
probative in the ADEA context. See Grabb v. Bendix Corp., 666 F.Supp. 1223 (N.D.Ind. 1986).
See, e.g., Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine Division of Coltec Industries, 328 F.3d 309, 320
(7th Cir. 2003) (holding that, in ADEA reduction in force case, “[i]n order to be considered, the
statistics must look at the same part of the company where the plaintiff worked; include only other
employees who were similarly situated with respect to performance, qualifications, and conduct;
the plaintiff and the other similarly situated employees must have shared a common supervisor;
and treatment of the other employees must have occurred during the same RIF as when the plaintiff
was discharged”); Hemsworth v. Quotesmith.com, Inc.,476 F.3d 487, 491 – 492 (7th Cir. 2007)
(holding that statistical evidence that 84 percent of coworkers laid off during prior RIF were over
age 40 did not establish that employee’s subsequent termination was motivated by age
discrimination under direct method, absent explanation as to how coworkers compared to
employee), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir.
2016); Vaughn v. CA Technologies, Inc., 169 F.Supp.3d 833, 840 (N.D.Ill. 2016) (“While plaintiffs
in RIF cases ‘bear no heavier a burden of proof than other ADEA plaintiffs,’ . . . Plaintiff needs to
muster statistics that involve employees that are comparable in light of their experience,
performance, and qualifications.” [Citation omitted.]).
C. [5.26] Releases and Waivers
Assuming there is no statistically adverse impact against any protected group, an employer who
implements a reduction in force should consider offering discharged employees severance pay or
other consideration to which they are not otherwise entitled in exchange for a comprehensive
release of claims. By obtaining such a release, the employer may be able to foreclose any future
litigation with its attendant expense, risk, and lost management time.
Courts have consistently recognized that Title VII permits employers and employees to settle
disputes by using waiver agreements as long as the waiver of rights and release of potential liability
are “voluntary and knowing.” Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 39 L.Ed.2d 147, 94
S.Ct. 1011, 1021 n.15 (1974). To ensure that older workers will not be coerced or manipulated into
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waiving their rights to seek relief under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the ADEA, as
amended by the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA), Pub.L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat.
978 (1990), sets forth certain minimum requirements to establish a knowing and voluntary waiver.
A failure to adhere to these requirements may render the employee’s waiver unenforceable and
leave the employer vulnerable to suit on ADEA claims despite having granted the employee
monetary consideration in exchange for a waiver of such claims. See, e.g., Oubre v. Entergy
Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 139 L.Ed.2d 849, 118 S.Ct. 838 (1998); Adams v. Ameritech
Services, Inc., 231 F.3d 414, 431 (7th Cir. 2000); Oberg v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 11 F.3d 679 (7th
Cir. 1993).
There are seven minimum requirements:
1. The waiver must be part of an agreement that is written in plain English. According to the
EEOC’s regulations, this means that
[w]aiver agreements must be drafted in plain language geared to the level of
understanding of the individual party to the agreement or individuals eligible to
participate. Employers should take into account such factors as the level of
comprehension and education of typical participants. Consideration of these
factors usually will require the limitation or elimination of technical jargon and
of long, complex sentences. 29 C.F.R. §1625.22(b)(3).
2. The waiver must specifically refer to rights or claims arising under the ADEA.
3. The employee may not waive rights or claims that arise after the date the waiver is signed.
4. The employee may waive rights or claims only in exchange for money or other benefits
that exceed those to which the employee would already be entitled under the employer’s existing
benefits programs. “If a benefit or other thing of value was eliminated in contravention of law or
contract, express or implied, the subsequent offer of such benefit or thing of value in connection
with a waiver” is insufficient to make the waiver knowing and voluntary. 29 C.F.R. §1625.22(d).
5. The employee must be advised, in writing, to consult with an attorney before signing the
agreement.
6. The employee must be given at least 21 days to consider the agreement before signing it.
If the waiver is sought by the employer in connection with exit incentives or employment retirement
programs offered to a group or class of employees (defined as more than one employee) rather than
to merely a single employee, employees must be given at least 45 (rather than 21) days to consider
and sign the agreement. 29 U.S.C. §626(f)(1)(F).
7. The agreement must provide that the employee may revoke the agreement within 7 days
following the agreement’s signing. See generally 29 U.S.C. §626; 29 C.F.R. §1625.22.

5 — 44

WWW.IICLE.COM

PLANT CLOSINGS AND REDUCTIONS IN FORCE

§5.26

According to the EEOC’s regulations, the OWBPA sets forth the “minimum requirements for
determining whether a waiver is knowing and voluntary.” 29 C.F.R. §1625.22(a)(2). Further,
“[o]ther facts and circumstances may bear on the question . . . as, for example, if there is a material
mistake, omission, or misstatement in the information furnished by the employer to an employee
in connection with the waiver.” 29 C.F.R. §1625.22(a)(3).
of

In addition, the employer must inform all affected employees in writing and in plain English
1. any class, unit, or group of individuals covered by the incentive program and the eligibility
factors and time limits applicable to the program; and
2. the job titles and ages of all individuals eligible or selected for the program and the ages of
individuals in the same job classifications who have not been selected for the program. 29
U.S.C. §§626(f)(1)(H); 29 C.F.R. §1625.22(f)(3).

If the waiver is sought in connection with exit incentive or employment retirement programs
offered to a group or class of employees, it is important that employees not be misled or deceived
with regard to any information provided regarding any subsequent actions, such as layoffs or
terminations. Thus, if subsequent layoffs or terminations are being contemplated or discussed,
employees who are eligible for the early retirement incentive program (ERIP) and request
information about subsequent layoffs or terminations should be advised of the criteria by which
those decisions will be made. To avoid discrimination claims, the criteria by which those decisions
will be made must be carefully thought out and articulated.
Waivers and releases executed in settlement of pending EEOC charges or pending court actions
are treated differently than waivers and releases obtained before filing formal proceedings. When
agency or court proceedings are pending, the 21-day pre-signing consideration period does not
apply; instead, the individual must be given only a reasonable amount of time to consider and sign
the settlement agreement. 29 U.S.C. §626(f)(2). In addition, the provision allowing employees 7
days to revoke the agreement is inapplicable to waivers and releases signed in settlement of pending
administrative or court actions. Id. Because the term “reasonable” amount of time is not defined,
in practice most employers typically provide a review period of 21 days for single terminations or
45 days for group termination and also 7 days to revoke.
An employee’s execution of a waiver and release does not affect the EEOC’s rights and
responsibilities to enforce the OWBPA, and no waiver can be used to interfere with an employee’s
right to file a charge or participate in any EEOC investigation. 29 U.S.C. §626(f)(4).
An employee who signs a waiver and then contends that the waiver is invalid is not required to
return or offer to return the money or other benefits that the employer provided in exchange for the
waiver in order to file suit against the employer under the ADEA. This is known as the “tender
back” doctrine. In Oubre, supra, the employer sought to enforce a release of ADEA claims or
alternatively to recover $6,000 it had paid the employee. The Supreme Court rejected both of the
employer’s arguments, holding that the release was unenforceable because it failed the OWBPA’s
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time requirements and made no specific reference to claims under the ADEA. A divided Court held
further that the employee’s retention of severance pay did not amount to a ratification of the release
of ADEA claims and that the employee was not required to tender back the employer’s payment as
a precondition to filing her ADEA suit.
Following Oubre, the EEOC issued regulations providing that an individual who signs a
“waiver agreement . . . is not required to tender back the consideration given for that agreement
before filing either a lawsuit or a charge of discrimination with [the] EEOC.” 29 C.F.R.
§1625.23(a). Further, “[n]o . . . waiver agreement, covenant not to sue, or other equivalent
arrangement may impose any condition precedent, any penalty, or any other limitation adversely
affecting any individual’s right to challenge the agreement.” 29 C.F.R. §1625.23(b). This
prohibition includes, “but is not limited to, provisions requiring employees to tender back
consideration received, and provisions allowing employers to recover attorneys’ fees and/or
damages because of the filing of an ADEA suit.” Id. The regulations also provide that “[n]o
employer may abrogate its duties to any signatory under a waiver agreement, covenant not to sue,
or other equivalent agreement, even if one or more of the signatories or the EEOC successfully
challenges the validity of that agreement under the ADEA.” 29 C.F.R. §1625.23(d). Finally, if an
employee not only sidesteps a waiver but also prevails in the subsequent ADEA claim, the court
may not order a setoff against the plaintiff employee’s monetary award that exceeds “the amount
recovered by the employee, or the consideration the employee received for signing the waiver
agreement.” 29 C.F.R. §1625.23(c)(1).
D. [5.27] Reduction in Force Early Retirement Benefits
Early retirement incentive programs were specifically affected by the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act in that the OWBPA amended the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to provide
that “[i]t shall not be unlawful for an employer . . . to observe the terms of a bona fide employee
benefit plan . . . that is a voluntary early retirement incentive plan consistent with the relevant
purpose or purposes of [the ADEA].” 29 U.S.C. §623(f). Thus, when a company plans a reduction
in force, it may decide first to offer early retirement benefits to employees to encourage their
voluntary separation before implementing involuntary layoffs.
If an ERIP or any portion of an ERIP is provided under a qualified retirement plan, other
considerations become important as the ERIP will be considered a form of benefit under the plan.
As such, it is subject to the nondiscrimination rules applicable to qualified plans under the Internal
Revenue Code. In particular, the ERIP must satisfy the 26 U.S.C. §401(a)(4) prohibition against
discrimination in favor of highly compensated employees in the availability of optional forms of
benefits. For plans that use calendar years, a highly compensated employee is any employee who
(1) was a 5-percent owner of the employer at any time during that year or the previous year or (2)
had compensation in excess of the amount set by the Internal Revenue Service for that year and, if
the employer elects and the plan provides, was in the top-20 percent of the highest paid group of
employees in the calendar year when ranked on the basis of compensation. 26 U.S.C. §414(q). For
2017, the compensation set by the IRS was $120,000.
On the other hand, ERIPs that provide a flat dollar amount (e.g., $20,000), service-based
benefits (e.g., $1,000 multiplied by years of service), or a percentage of salary to all employees

5 — 46

WWW.IICLE.COM

PLANT CLOSINGS AND REDUCTIONS IN FORCE

§5.27

above a certain age should be held to be consistent with the relevant purposes of the ADEA.
Similarly, ERIPs that provide flat dollar increases in pension benefits (e.g., $200 per month) or
percentage increases should also be held to be consistent with the relevant purposes of the ADEA.
Finally, ERIPs that impute years of service and/or age (e.g., a program that gives employees age
55 or older who retire during the specified window period credit for five additional years of service
and/or age) would likewise be consistent with the relevant purposes of the ADEA.
In addition to the above restrictions, the OWBPA specifically allows employers to use two
types of benefit packaging in connection with layoffs or terminations pursuant to a RIF. First, the
employer may reduce the severance benefits that would otherwise be provided to workers by the
value of their retiree health benefits if the retiree health benefits satisfy certain minimum standards.
Second, the value of additional pension benefits that are provided to workers solely because of the
layoff may be offset against severance pay under certain circumstances. In no other instance may
an employer reduce or deny severance based on pension eligibility or pension receipt.
As mentioned above, there are rules and regulations that prohibit discrimination in favor of
highly compensated employees. Although these regulations are extremely complex, a simplified
testing procedure is provided for qualified ERIPs. To qualify, an ERIP must be available for not
more than one year and must consist of a new early retirement option, a change in the formula for
an existing early retirement option, or qualified social security supplements.
Under the simplest version of the test, an ERIP satisfies the nondiscrimination rules if the
percentage of non-highly compensated employees eligible for the ERIP is at least 70 percent of the
percentage of highly compensated employees. For example, assume an employer has 10 highly
compensated and 100 non-highly compensated employees. If the employer offers an ERIP to 2 of
the 10 highly compensated employees (20 percent), it must offer the ERIP to 14 of the 100 nonhighly compensated employees (14 percent) to qualify since 14 percent is 70 percent of 20 percent.
The 70-percent requirement can be reduced to as little as 20 percent depending on the composition
of the employer’s workforce and the manner in which the class of eligible employees is defined.
In addition to being eligible for the simplified test, a qualified ERIP needs to be tested only in
the year in which it is introduced and has no permanent effect on the plan’s benefit formula for
purposes of nondiscrimination testing. An ERIP that does not meet these requirements for
simplified testing may have the effect of complicating discrimination testing even after it has
expired.
In addition to satisfying the nondiscrimination requirements of 26 U.S.C. §401(a)(4), an ERIP
that is contained in a qualified retirement plan may raise issues under 26 U.S.C. §411(d)(6), which
generally prohibits the elimination of certain benefits, rights, and features, which may include early
retirement options, under a plan. If an ERIP is offered on a temporary basis, it will not be considered
to be a permanent part of the plan and can be eliminated under §411(d)(6). However, if the
employer offers a series of ERIPs over several years, the ERIPs may be considered to constitute a
permanent addition to the plan and thus cannot be eliminated under §411(d)(6). The IRS has ruled
that ERIPs offered in four consecutive years will not be considered a permanent addition to the
plan, provided that there are independent business reasons for each of the ERIPs.
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As a boost to employers who may want to offer early retirement incentives to long-term
employees, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act does not prevent an employer from
conditioning the receipt of benefits on an employee’s waiver of job-related claims. See Lockheed
Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 135 L.Ed.2d 153, 116 S.Ct. 1783 (1996).
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